How decliners get data so wrong

Posted November 23, 2017 by humanshuddle
Categories: AQ Arab Peninsula (Yemen), da'wa, Data Science

Western habitus and Jihadist media:

media_battle_on_fire

The understanding of the jihadist movement is a research task which requires collaboration between data analysis and subject matter expertise, a formulation Jeffery Stanton described in his book Introduction to Data Science.

Daulati_Baqiyah

Previous posts have focused on the role of subject matter expertise, and how the study of the Jihadist movement has tried to understand it in terms of street criminals, gangsters, individuals obsessed with computer games (particularly first person shooters), and a desire to go from zero-to-hero. These interpretations originate from the attempt to view the subject matter – Jihadist media – through a Western and predominantly English language lens. In this lens, not even Latinized Arabic key words from the rich blend of Arabic dominated theological motifs are reflected upon sufficiently. This traps the interpretation within specific perceptive dispositions that Pierre Bourdieu calls habitus.[i] These interpretations frequently lack any attempt to address the theological aspects of the movement, even the simple references in the titles of media products go unnoticed. This, as a consequence, leaves the analysis dislocated from the repeated referencing of the concepts, which link together to construct chains that anchor contemporary media to the foundations created by scholars stretching back through the history of Jihadist writing, (and furthermore, the redundant yet coherent use of historical writings used by jihadists to enhance and enrich their posture).

For example, most discussion and interpretation of the series Salil al-Sawarim (SAS), located in a Western habitus, focused on the Hollywood style or slick production values – just as understanding of the movement often revolves around ideas of ‘brand’ and ‘marketing’. However, as noted in the previous post SAS:

 

is particularly illustrative of this emphasis on theology. Readers sufficiently initiated into the mainly Arabic language corpus of Sunni extremist theology will understand the title’s particular reference right away;[1] it refers to the book al-Sarim al-maslul ‘ala shatim al-rasul, “the Sharp Sword on whoever Insults the Prophet.” Its author is 13th century Islamic scholar Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328 AD),

Equally consider the sound effect used to underscore references to Ibn Taymiyya’s writings in numerous AQ and IS videos. It is no coincidence that it is a high pitched metallic sound effect which recreates a sword being drawn from its scabbard.

Interpreting the movement with references to a street crime, zero-to-hero, and gangsta lifestyle, creates an impression recruits are being lured to join ISIS with the promise of Big Screen TVs, blunts, 40s and bitches… (to quote ‘Steve Berman’).[ii] These interpretations lack any attempt to address the theological aspects of the movement, nor encoded cultural understandings, and the meaning evident to those from (or sufficiently initiated into) an alternative habitus.

William Rowlandson argues, definitions are “really a debate about who owns the words”.[iii] Framing the interpretation of Jihadist media within a Western habitus focuses interpretation firmly within the comfort zone of English speaking commentators who often have little familiarity with the theological and historical reference points used by the movement, nor a nuanced understanding of the concepts expressed by Jihadists in Arabic. To maintain their ownership over such interpretations, it has become increasingly important for some commentators to downplay the role of theology.

Instead, bolstered by a focus on defecting European Foreign Fighters, these commentators attempt to wrest the analytical locus of the jihadist movement away from the complex, and unfamiliar Arabic core – preferring instead to locate understanding within a Western habitus. This approach fences off alternative world views and further seeks to extend Western hegemonic ownership over meaning – developed since 9/11 became a moment of universal temporal rupture.

Western policymakers reviewing recent media statements, commentary and research will have found a confused range of interpretations for the Resilience and Appeal of “Islamic State” media content. This confusion is as often due to an imbalance between the level of subject matter and data analysis expertise. For example, the data analysis of ISIS networks on VK, deployed a robust data analysis approach for the online phase of the research, but from the outset struggled with the subject matter. The authors appeared surprised to find women prominent in the digital outreach efforts.

However, as Saudi former Usama bin Laden bodyguard and first-generation leader of AQAP Yusuf al-‘Uyayri wrote in ‘The Role of the Women in Fighting the Enemies’:

the woman is an important element in the struggle today, and she must participate in it with all of her capacity and with all of her passion. And her participation does not mean the conclusion of the struggle – no. Rather, her participation is counted as a pillar from amongst the pillars that cause victory and the continuation of the path.[iv]

The document highlights women as fighters and participants in battle (mujahidah being the female form of mujahid):

[T]o show the importance of your role in this clash today between the religions of Kufr and the Religion of Islam, and especially in the new crusade that the world is waging against Islam and the Muslims under the leadership of America, then we must remind you of an aspect of your role, reflected in the image of the Mujahidah of the Islamic Golden Age.

While acknowledging limitations on the involvement in battle – outside of specific circumstances – the document states

… we want you to follow the women of the Salaf (female companions of the prophet) in their incitement (inspire) to fight and their preparation for it and their patience on this path and their longing to participate in it with everything in return for the victory of Islam.

Far from being unlikely to be involved in online activities, this emphasis on incitement, preparation, and participation should highlight the expected role women may play within the online struggle – including on VK.

Familiarity with these texts is not just a niche historical interest. AQAP theologians such as Yusuf al-‘Uyairi and their many writings have long mattered to IS (not just in the time since they caught the attention of commentators as they swept into Syria). Many of the Arabic language productions by IS have strong lingual and theological ties to content produced by the original incarnation of AQAP, yet IS was the first group to have the room, territory and thus resource to apply the otherwise theoretical theology that was brought into organized existence by key leaders and theologians such as al-‘Uyairi. His study circles, strategic writings, sober analysis of U.S. intervention into Iraq etc. are reflected in the structure and output of contemporary IS media releases and notions. Furthermore, a eulogy of al-‘Uyairi (died 2003) by his brother in arms al-‘Awshan (who was also killed shortly after) was downloaded nearly 3,000 times in just one core IS-Telegram channel.

Data Science:

Familiarity with subject matter is one aspect of data science, the other is the familiarity with data handling and statistical techniques. One of the most common elements of commentary (and confusion) is the question of how much ISIS content is being produced, and what it looks like – sadly fewer column inches are allotted to the strategic purpose this content serves.

Since mid-September the stream of commentary, reports, and presentation claiming to show some element of the online presence or Virtual Caliphate has gathered pace. However, as methods vary wildly, and statements are often ad hoc responses what an individual personally saw on Twitter, rather than explanations of research that carries predictive value, politicians can be forgiven their moments of confusion.

Take these statements – both in November from Charlie Winter, one of the proponents of the flawed concept of a Virtual caliphate:

“The caliphate will continue to exist no matter what happens on the ground,”[v]

And

“My latest on the state of #IS’s virtual caliphate. Bottom line up front: It’s not doing too well these days”.[vi]

September:

Back in late September he told a Wired security event about the ‘Virtual Caliphate’:

“There’s a lot of propaganda coming out on a daily basis,” … “Hundreds and hundreds of unique media products, videos, magazines, radio bulletins, in lots of different languages coming out every single day.”[vii]

Tech World reported from the event:

ISIS and its central media office, Winter claims, is “really effective” at keeping up that flow of information – and the propaganda side is something that the group strongly tries to maintain. “I think some of them are addicted to this propaganda, it’s something the group really tries to cultivate, the interdependence between the brand and supporters,” he says.

October:

In October the claim changed, now ISIS had only produced a total of 300 items for the month of September. This claim included a graphic which purported to show “#IS’s media machine is contracting. A large proportion of the propaganda apparatus is now almost totally dormant”.[viii]

It later transpired that to produce the impression that sections of the ISIS media apparatus were “totally dormant” any foundation or province thought to have produced 4 or fewer pieces of content was excluded.

Despite the grainy resolution of the accompanying graphic it was possible to see that the approach had significant methodological problems. The viewer could make out which provinces were considered ‘dormant’. These included al-Furat, Somalia, Khurasan, Bayda’, Anbar, & West Africa. The problem was simple:  all these actually produced more than four pieces of content in September.

Publishing the image provided conclusive proof that from a data science perspective, the research is not analysing ISIS production, but recording the declining ability of a particular individual to locate ISIS content.

Furthermore, the impact of the methodological limitations means that from a data science perspective the graphs showing ‘content type’ actually record the type of content which this individual is able to find – not an assessment of the type of content ISIS is actually producing. A subtle difference, but one which makes all the difference in data science.

Equally problematic, this analysis equates the publication of a single photo with that of an hour-long video and a 16-page newspaper. As a result, the organisation that published the 46 minute speech by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, at the end of September 2017 is recorded as dormant because it only produced the first recording of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to be released in the last 10 months.

It should be needless to write, this audio-release by al-Furqan is of much greater importance than a single image, or photo report – at least for IS sympathizers and operatives. Although currently we still find ourselves having to write it.

November:

In November, the claims of drastic decline continue; “Nowadays, IS propagandists can barely get out 20 pieces of media in a week”.[ix] As in October, from a data science perspective the claim is based on the declining ability of a specific individual to find content, not actual IS production.

The gulf between rhetoric and reality continues to widen.

November has witness the continued weekly production of the 16-page newspaper al-Naba’ with associated infographics (now 106 issues in total) and numerous photo reports, at least 39 at time of writing (22nd November), collectively containing 215 unique images from 11 different provinces, including al-Furat, Khurasan, al-Khayr, Diyala, and the Khalid ibn al-Walid army. In addition, al-Bayyan has continued to be broadcast, providing a range of radio programmes and daily updates (available to stream, and download in MP3, text and pdf versions in a range of languages).

November also saw the launch of a new 16 page magazine al-Anfal along with videos from provinces including al-Baraka which produced two videos & one each from Damascus, Salah al-Din, al-Janub, and Diyala, bringing the total to six without the inclusion of non-Wilayat video production. This volume of production is a far cry from claims “ISIS is struggling to produce 20 items a week”.

In fact, not only does the current content for November eclipse the ‘struggling 20 a week’ mark, on current pace the images alone will exceed the claim of 300 pieces for September. A situation which echoes the 2016 CTC report on ISIS visual production. That report also claimed significant decline in ISIS production. However, subsequent analysis showed ISIS weekly production actually exceeded the CTC estimate of monthly production. (New Netwar p. 38) This was because CTC, just like these more recent claims of decline, were based on tracking the declining ability of the researchers to find content, not the ability of ISIS to produce it.

Given the ongoing level of production, it is hard to see how a data science approach could produce a credible analysis which shows a shift from; “There’s a lot of propaganda coming out on a daily basis” in late September to; “struggling to produce 20 a week” by early November. But this type of confusion is not unusual; the lack of collaboration between data analysis and subject matter expertise regularly results in research which fails to produce a coherent understanding of the information ecosystem. As is often the case these studies bear little resemblance to the observable reality for those able to access and understand the content produced by the jihadist movement.

For example, a Home Office funded VOX-Pol study concluded ‘the IS Twitter community is now almost non-existent’. Yet at the time of the study 40% of known traffic to ISIS content was coming from Twitter. In addition, a presentation during the recent VOX-Pol conference at ICSR contained research showing there were “90 tweets planning terrorist attacks are tweeted per minute”.[x] That conference also produced the rather cryptic statement that “The deep web should be inhospitable, but not too inhospitable”.[xi]

The need to understand how ISIS networks of influence operate at a strategic level is now evident to almost all – and it requires data science based on the collaboration between data analysts and subject matter experts to achieve it. Understanding the information ecosystem is about more than peering down soda straws at handpicked examples; it is about the way different parts of the ecosystem co-exist and intersect; it is about the way the humans behind the screens interact and fundamentally about the content they share. This includes the documents which outline the strategy and tactics which the Jihadist movement currently intends to use.

The Jihadist movement distributes their strategy in their own words, these words should not be obscured by disciplinary siloes, a failure to collaborate, nor an attempt to force the understanding of the movement into a Western, predominantly English language, habitus.

 

Notes:

[i] The influence of habitus within Critical Terrorism Studies, particularly with reference to 9/11 as a point of temporal rupture is discussed by Harmonie Toros. While this focuses largely on temporal elements the approach is equally applicable here.:

Harmonie Toros, “9/11 is alive and well” or how critical terrorism studies has sustained the 9/11 narrative, Critical Studies on Terrorism Vol. 10 , Iss. 2, 2017

[ii] Track 6, The Marshall Mathers LP

This deliberately crass reference to Dr Dre is used to emphasise the gulf between the imagery of western gangsta rap and what Jihadist media actually contains.

[iii] Rowlandson, W. 2015. Imaginal Landscapes: Reflections on the Mystical Visions of Jorge Luis Borges and Emanuel Swedenborg. London: Swedenborg Society.

Quoted in Harmonie Toros, “9/11 is alive and well” or how critical terrorism studies has sustained the 9/11 narrative, Critical Studies on Terrorism Vol. 10 , Iss. 2, 2017

[iv] Yusuf Bin Salih Al-‘Uyayri, The Role Of The Women In Fighting The Enemies, (Translated version) At-Tibyan Publications

[v] https://www.thedailybeast.com/winning-the-battle-losing-the-message-inside-americas-utter-failure-to-counter-isis-propaganda

[vi] https://twitter.com/charliewinter/status/928586607271268352

[vii] https://www.techworld.com/security/how-isis-runs-its-central-media-operation-3664672/

[viii] https://twitter.com/charliewinter/status/920651518172332032

[ix] http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-41845285

[x] https://twitter.com/VOX_Pol/status/919914070907736065

[xi] https://twitter.com/VOX_Pol/status/919952628632707074

Notes on the “Salil al-sawarim” series: the theological framework – from Amsterdam to the “Islamic State”

Posted November 16, 2017 by Nico Prucha
Categories: Attacks in Europe, counter-counter-terrorism, Iraq, ISIS, Theology of Violence

SAS4 cover

The release of the video Salil al-sawarim (SaS) by ISIS’s media department al-Furqan in May 2014 demonstrated the sophistication of the jihadist use of social media to disseminate their video content. At the time, this had been Twitter – needless to write, Telegram as of early 2016 – and now in full swing as of end of 2017 – has replaced Twitter as the first entry point for new IS curated content. The Twitter metrics are detailed at Jihadica (two part series). Notions and sentiments visualized by videos such as Salil al-Sawarim over the past years have enabled to jihadists to project influence on a number of layers and levels, demonstrating how – in their mindset – Islamic territory has to be “restored” and “cleansed”. The first three Salil al-sawarim videos had been very popular, high quality edited and showed a mix of extreme obscene violence and ideology at play by IS’ predecessor “the Islamic State of Iraq”.

This post provides a few elements of  Salil al-sawarim 4, or the “clanging of the swords, 4”  as it provides an excellent example of a certain form of IS propaganda. More specifically, it is a key example of how IS uses theology to justify the actions of its fighters and legitimise its occupation of territory in Syria and Iraq – and the legacy it leaves behind as of end of 2017 with the loss of most of the territory the jihadists had managed to control, according to al-Quds al-Arabi.

The series Salil al-Sawarim is particularly illustrative of this emphasis on theology. Readers sufficiently initiated into the mainly Arabic language corpus of Sunni extremist theology will understand the title’s particular reference right away;[1] it refers to the book al-Sarim al-maslul ‘ala shatim al-rasul, “the Sharp Sword on whoever Insults the Prophet.” Its author is 13th century Islamic scholar Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328 AD), who is often referred to as shaykh al-Islam (“the scholar of Islam) in the conservative / orthodox Arabic-Islamic framework.

Ibn Taymiyya is renowned for his “characteristically juridical thinking”[2] and viewed as a highly competent legal scholar. His writings are based – at least in part – on Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh).

IT asSarim almaslul

Ibn Taymiyya has featured prominently in Sunni extremist thought since the 1980s, when AQ established this ideology. The “Islamic State” has based all of its audio-visual output on the theology penned by AQ. The crucial difference is that IS has the territory to implement and enforce this corpus of theology on the population of the self-designated “caliphate”.

Ibn Taymiyya provides a legal framework based on jurisprudential findings for killing “an insulter of the prophet, regardless whether he is a Muslim or a disbeliever”.[3] Whoever insults the Prophet, according to Ibn Taymiyya, “must be killed, no matter if he is a Muslim or disbeliever, and has no right to repent.”

Within the Sunni extremist mind-set, the sword must be drawn upon anyone who opposes their worldview and specific interpretation of Qur’anic sources or the hadith (sayings and deeds of Prophet Muhammad). In various AQ and IS videos, a specific sound effect subtly underscores references to Ibn Taymiyya’s writings. This sound effect, popular within jihadist online subculture, is that of a sword drawn from its shaft, clanging in the process.

Jihadists have also used the writings of Ibn Taymiyya to justify specific attacks. For example, Muhammed Bouyeri cited Ibn Taymiyya’s book before killing Dutch filmmaker and Islam critic Theo van Gogh in November 2004 in Amsterdam:

“Shortly before he [Bouyeri] killed van Gogh, he circulated the theological tractate on the “heroic deed” of Ibn Maslama[4] per e-mail to his friends. It is one of the 56 texts Bouyeri wrote or distributed. The fatwa of Ibn Taymiyya was among them also in a short leaflet-form downloadable from tawhed.ws titled “The drawn sword against the insulter of the Prophet” (al-sarim al-maslul didda shatim al-rasul). It is likely that the text not only influenced Bouyeri’s decision to assassinate van Gogh, but also his method.

The text details how and why to kill targets, first of all because of insult (shatm, sabb, adhan) of Islam. Bouyeri tried to sever van Gogh’s head with a big knife after he had shot him several times. In the text we find the passage: “the cutting of the head without mercy is legal if the Prophet does not disapprove it.” Moreover, the text advises multiple times to use assassination as an act of deterrence. The slaughter of van Gogh in open daylight seems like a one-to-one translation into reality of the directives we find in the text.”[5]vanGogh_Buyairi

User-created content on Twitter praising the killing of Theo van Gogh, outlining the theological obligation to hunt anyone who insults Prophet Muhammad or God.[6]

In addition, AQ alluded to the writings of Ibn Taymiyya in a video claiming responsibility for a suicide bombing targeting the Embassy of Denmark in Pakistan in 2008[7] after a Danish newspaper published cartoon depictions of Muhammad.

Ibn Taymiyya is among several traditionalists and historical scholars who have explored the subject of avenging the Prophet Muhammad. The work by Jordanian-Palestinian jihadist scholar Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi stands out in its attempt to clearly outline who can be killed legitimately for insulting Prophet Muhammad. Al-Maqdisi extends this beyond individuals, and says any government deemed to have insulted either the Prophet, God or religion in general is a legitimate target for reprisal.[8]

In January 2015 two brothers, apparently trained in Yemen by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, opened fire in the offices of the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo. After the attack, a bystander filmed the Kouachi brothers shouting, “We have avenged the Prophet” (li-intiqamna al-rasul), before fatally shooting wounded French police officer Ahmad Merabet.[9] A video published on January 11, 2015 by the IS-affiliated media outlet, Asawitimedia, praised the attacks. The video is entitled “The French have insulted the Prophet of God – thus a merciless reaction.”

fransasabbu

“The French have insulted the Prophet of God”

There is a coherent message across jihadist writings, videos, and theological decrees that say vengeance restores the dignity of Prophet Muhammad. They command individuals worldwide to demonstrate their faith by responding violently to those who insult the Prophet.

IS’ fourth Salil al-Sawarim movie, in which retribution for insulting Prophet Muhammad is the underlying principle of a brutal and rapidly emerging sectarian war (harb ta’ifi), shows IS fighters seeking to exterminate the Shiites, portrayed as a group that has insulted the prophet, his companions, God, and in sum, Islam, since the early days of the religion. This is one of the key theological principles of “the Islamic State of Iraq” that then became even more important in the phase of conquest and expansion into Syria 2012 onwards. The countless videos by the then re-named “Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham” ensured to reformat its newley conquered territory – on the one hand, killing or forcing locals to join – or public “recant” and return to IS understanding of ahl al-Sunna wa-l jama’a – and on the other hand the systematic eradication of Sufi shrines, graveyards, sacred trees, Shiite mosques, Yazidi temples, Christian churches etc. as based on AQ’s penned and yet fiercly deployed theology by IS’ Godfather Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi – and embodied by the IS and the khilafa as tradition henceforth.

2014IRdes

Such nuances are at the very core of all Sunni extremist Arabic language releases – not since IS, but since the very 1980s. What we have witnessed is a subsequent expansion of theological steered acts across regions and countries where Sunni extremists in recent years have had the chance to set up a foothold – no matter how temporary that has been.

in the above sequences of screenshots  Ibn al-Qayyim, the disciple of Ibn Taymiyya, referred to as shaykh al-Islam by orthodox Muslims is cited in regards of the destruction of the “site of veneration by the rafidimushrikin”. The text serves as the jurisprudence for IS to act:

  • “it is not permissible [for Sunni Muslims] to leave the sites and places of shirk and idols untouched once the power to destroy them is established, even if just for one day. For these are the symbols of kufr and shirk are the from the greatest of evil. Therefore, it is not permissible to rule maintaining after conquering these sites.”
  • In Arabic: tawaghit, plural of taghut, a term used in reference of worldly tyrant rulers and idols, worshipped in violation of tawhid. The fight against taghut in jihadist mindset is bound by both elements – fighting worldly un-Islamic Arab regimes and thus restore the ‘true’ Islamic community (umma).

For example, SAS4 shows several sequences in which murdered Iraqi soldiers are described as Shiites, or rejectionists (rafida), a degrading term in Sunni extremist literature. The film marks Shiites as inferior humans who constitute the “interior enemy” because they are Arabs – in Iraq at the time as opposed to the Iranian intervention later. It follows that they are Islam’s most important foe and must be fought first and foremost.

Text and videos are not the only means of spreading the theoretical principle of avenging the Prophet; two of the most popular jihadist songs, or nashid, on YouTube reference Ibn Taymiyya and the notion of killing all those who insult Islam. A nashid by Abu Yaseer has had over 1.5 million views and can easily be retrieved online by searching for “Salil al-Sawarim”.[10] A related nashid with the title “the words [are now about action and hence] words of the sword” by Abu ‘Ali has over 3.5 million views.[11] The reference of the “sword” unites both nashid.

The four-part Salil al-sawarim series conveys three main themes:

  1. Punishment: It is legitimate to kill anyone considered a non-Sunni Muslim, in particular the Shiites of Iraq. Shiism
  2. by Sunni extremist standards is portrayed as a sect that has deviated from Islam and seeks to destroy Sunni Islam from within.
  3. Inclusion and representation: IS is shown operating carefully within Sunni territories in Iraq and Syria, assassinating key government figures and offering the Sunni majority a chance to reintegrate into the true Sunni community – represented solely by the “Islamic State” – by repenting (tawba) their sin of having worked for non-Sunni Muslims.

The chance to repent has become an integral part of IS strategy to consolidate newly-conquered territory. Key IS ideologues such as Abu Muhammad al-‘Adnani have supported this strategy; it consists of annihilating key figures of the Iraqi government; punishing Sunnis who collaborated with the Americans or Shiites; and offering Sunni police and soldiers a chance to be cleansed of their sins and restored as true members of the Sunni community by renouncing their past actions and swearing allegiance to al-Baghdadi.

Salil al-sawarim has turned into a popular and active meme online. It fosters IS identity and creates role models in a fandom-styled environment where users can create and upload their own images to praise videos like SAS and the worldview they depict.

IS has become more than an idea or a physical movement. It has managed to spread its “values” and theological reference points across a wide range of online platforms in a number of languages, primarily Arabic.

[1] Rüdiger Lohlker, Why Theology Matters – the Case of Jihadi Islam, Strategic Review (July-September 2016), http://sr-indonesia.com/in-the-journal/view/europe-s-misunderstanding-of-islam-and-isis

[2] Wael b. Hallaq: Ibn Taymiyya against the Greek Logicians. Translated with an introduction by Wael Hallaq, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, xxxiii.

[3] The book is available online on various websites and outlets, for example Dorar al-Sunniyya, www.dorar.net. A print version is available in most religious book shops in Arab countries. The image is a book cover illustration of a commented version published as: Ibn Taymiyya, al-Sarim al-maslul ‘ala shatim al-rasul li-shaykh al-Islam Taqiyy al-Din Ahmad bin ‘Abd alHalim Ibn Taymiyya al-Harrani, Shibra al-Khayma: Alexandria and Medina, 2008.

[4] As the author of the citation Philipp Holtmann explains, “terrorists are called upon to identify with the Muslim Ibn Maslama who volunteered to kill Muhammad’s critic Ka’b bin al-Ashraf.” Philipp Holtmann, Virutal Leadership in Radical Islamist Movements: Mechanisms, Justifications and Discussion. Working Paper, The Institute for Policy and Strategy, Herzliya Conference February 6-9, 2011, http://www.herzliyaconference.org/eng/_Uploads/dbsAttachedFiles/PhilippHoltmann.pdf

[5] Ibid.

[6] The text praises Muhammad Bouyeri as a jihadist role model. Not only has he acted to avenge the violation of van Gogh against religion in general, but rather he, according to the text, denounced the worldly law in the Dutch court, claiming to only acknowledge shari’a law.

[7]A video entitled al-qawla qawla al-sawarim, “the words [are now about action and hence] words of the sword”, shows the testimony of the suicide operative identified as a Saudi by the nom de guerre Abu Gharib al-Makki [the Meccan]. The one-hour video justifies the attack; “the time to talk is over, the time for actions (i.e the swords must be drawn) has come to avenge the insults of Prophet Muhammad”.

[8] Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, al-Sarim al-maslul ‘ala sabb al-rabb aw al-din aw a-rasul sala l-llahu ‘alayhi wa-salam, Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l Jihad.

[9] A detailed oversight is provided by the BBC, also outlining in depth the attack by IS member Amedy Coulibaly who executed several hostages in a Jewish supermarket, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30708237

Amedy Coulibaly uploaded a video where he pledges allegiance to al-Baghdadi. Part of his video is used in one of the ‘official’ IS videos to applaud the January 2015 Paris attack, Risala ila Fransa, Wilayat Salah al-Din, February 14, 2015.

[10] Hosted by the YouTube Channel “The Great Breakfast War” – the channel & link have been deleted. Thank you YouTube!

[11] This singer was featured in Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula videos as far back as 2003/4.

Online Jihad: Data Science

Posted November 10, 2017 by humanshuddle
Categories: da'wa, Data Science, ISIS, Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI), Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), Jihadist Media Strategy - in their own words, Social Media Sunni Extremist Activism

Online Jihad has been monitoring online communities since the 2007 release of Asrar al-Mujahidin, intended to facilitate secure communication with Islamic State Iraq amongst other jihadist groups. Over the intervening period the volume of content and platforms used to disseminate content has expanded rapidly. Marking this, Online Jihad will have a new series of posts focusing on Data Science approaches to tracking the Jihadist movement.

Digital_war

The ability of al-Qa’ida (AQ), and subsequently ISIS, to propagate their theology and demonstrate their particular methodology via modern communication technology has proven to be one of the most resilient elements and greatest area of innovation. Supporters even share (and mock) content intended to be part of the ‘counternarrative’ effort. For example, the tweet (below) from @DOTArabic was shared by a range of Jihadist Telegram channels.  The tweet shares the link to an article about  ‘Terrorist rehab‘ (  المركز السوريّ لمحاربة الفكر المتطرّف ) opening in Northern Aleppo.

DOT_AR

The sharing of this type of content demonstrates an awareness of the influence operations against ISIS, which is also demonstrated by the Ansar al-Khilafah Publication – The Media War Upon The Islamic State: The Media Techniques of Misleading the Masses that lists different techniques which have been observed being used against ISIS. The techniques are grouped into Media Deviation, Propaganda and Psychological Warfare. These are the ‘three foundations’ through which “to make people stand with them or to turn away from al-Mujahedeen”.

The study of western tactics is particularly clear in two of the techniques identified in the Media War document.

‘Doubt Upon The Strength Of al-Mujahedeen’

The Media War Upon The Islamic State claims:

They will use words such as “so-called” or “alleged” or “apparently”. For example, they will say the “so-called fighters” or “so-called leader al-Adnani” and so forth, as if to give the impression that they do not really exist or that they are insignificant. They imply that there is something suspicious or false about the sources of al-Mujahedeen or any news of their successes or strengths.

‘Media Blackout’

Attempting to control the information available about the struggle with AQ and ISIS has been a common tactic across many theaters including the battle with the insurgency in Iraq and the current fighting against ISIS.

The Media War Upon The Islamic State claims:

“Sometimes [the Western coalition] do not want to admit casualties, and that is why you find many cases of several operations by al-Mujahedeen and news of this coming out of the battlefield or even their videos and evidence of it, yet you do not find any news about it in the mainstream media, as if it never happened.”

Reducing the level of AQ and ISIS content by removing content and suspending accounts has been a focal point of western policy, highlighted by many politicians and the heads of security services including GCHQ.

The Media War Upon The Islamic State, highlights “The mass twitter suspension is the perfect example” of the attempt to Blackout ISIS media. In addition, the ‘Global Coalition’ through official accounts such as the UK Against Daesh twitter account has taken a second angle, attempting to dissuade users and journalists from reporting or sharing Amaq content.

FCO_daesh

The AQ and ISIS strategists have long studied western tactics and understood how they would be leveraged against their movement. This contrasts with the confused interpretations for the Resilience and Appeal of “Islamic State” Electronic Propaganda often presented to western policymakers. Given the level of innovation, policy makers in the West are struggling to find a way to cope with the massive quantity and often times high quality productions issued by groups such IS who continue to draw in new recruits from western societies each month.

ansar 1000 tweets are 1000 arrows

Understanding how the internet is used to distribute content and build the networks of influence, which underpin the most resilient elements of the Jihadist movement, is vital. Unfortunately, while there has been no let-up in the quantity of analysis being published about ISIS media activities, there have been limitations in the quality of that analysis which has undermined the understanding of the Jihadist movement.

photo_2017-10-16_18-56-26

Online Jihad: Data Science

Lacking a nuanced understanding of the movement, both “counter-narratives” and takedowns have become trapped in a tactical paradigm. Once derided as a ‘straw man argument’, the need to understand how ISIS networks of influence operate at a strategic level is now evident to almost all; unfortunately in the meantime the tactical understanding of the movement has meant the U.S. and its Western allies have been drawn into open warfare online, on a battlefield chosen by their jihadist adversaries. As predicted in 2014, it is jihadist groups who have thrived in the chaos that resulted.

In 2017, highlighted in an earlier blog post:

… with the partial loss of territory and the de-population of Sunni urban centers in Syria and Iraq as a consequence, IS has withdrawn to the countryside, to continue the fight – and to maintain and upkeep their greatest weapon: media work as a means of long-term influence and resistance.

The study of the Jihadist movement has tried to understand it in terms of street criminals, gangsters, individuals obsessed with computer games (particularly first person shooters), and a desire to go from zero-to-hero. As shown in an earlier post;

these interpretations often lack any attempt to address the theological aspects of the movement … and prominence of scholars within the Jihadist movement’s overall interpretation of theological concepts, including an Islamic State model of governance.

Interpreting the work of the media mujahidin as marketing or in terms of their ‘brand’, fails to comprehend the role of their work within the movement – just as focusing on infographics and thinking in 140 characters leads to misunderstanding of the breadth and purpose of da’wah. Similarly using Hollywood as a frame of reference, rather than deep-rooted research on Islamic theology; and narrowly defined ‘official’ images rather than the true breadth of Arabic sources may sound good for 15 seconds, but it frequently underestimates the scale of content production and lacks the depth required to understand the purpose or strategy of the movement.

Focusing on social media, images, infographics and videos as ways of branding the jihadist movement, confuses the purpose of Jihad and da’wah;

“Jihad is Da’wah with a force, and is obligatory to perform with all available capabilities, until there remains only Muslims or people who submit to Islam.”[i]

Future posts in the Data Science stream on Online Jihad will focus on two themes,

  1. Applying Data Science methodology to monitor and understand Jihadist online communities,
  2. Highlighting where many of the current approaches to analysis of the jihadist movement lack nuance, use inappropriate methodology and at times fail to produce an authentic understanding of movement nor its strategy.

 

[i] Hashiyat ash-Shouruni and Ibn al-Qasim in Tahfa al-Mahtaj ‘ala al-Minhaj 9/213

Quoted by Abdullah Azzam, Defence of the Muslim Lands, (English translation work done jihadist media)

The March 2016 Brussels Attacks – 10 Reasons by the “Islamic State” & the context of the Sunni extremist universe

Posted October 15, 2017 by Nico Prucha
Categories: Attacks in Europe, ISIS, online jihad, Theology of Violence

umma wulud3 raqqa

On March 22, 2016, two bombings hit the city of Brussels. The bombings at Brussels airport and the metro station Maelbeek, which is located in the heart of the city and close by many European Union institutions, left 32 people dead from around the world – not including the three suicide bombers. As would later be the case with the Manchester bombings (May 22, 2017), several days later documents by IS were released to outline and justify these attacks. Based on theological grounds and grievances echoing from within the territory held by IS, a document was published on March 25, 2016, by al-Wafa’ – an official media organ of the “Islamic State”. The text is entitled “Ten Reasons to Clarify the Raids on the Capital [of Belgium] Brussels.” Penned by a woman by the nom de guerre of Umm Nusayba, ten reasons are clearly outlined why suicide bombers had attacked the airport and metro station.

This Arabic language text has not played any role, in the media reporting or the wider academia, to understand the motivation behind this terrorist attack – in the words of the terrorists. The same re-occurred when a similar text was released days after the May 2017 Manchester attack (here). It almost seems that ISIS has the luxury of disseminating their coherent extremist writings well knowing it reaches their target audience and bypasses most of the non-Arabic speaking counter-terrorism, media and academic analysts. Apart from being published on Telegram where a wider range of ISIS sympathizers is initiated into this mindset – and where most speak Arabic. The text references theological nuances and sentiments such as shirk as outlined earlier and maintains the obligation to attack the mushrikin and to “shake their thrones”.

“The Brussels raid that shocked the world and shook the thrones of the tawaghit[1] while the men of the caliphate – by the grace of God – have the capability to strike anywhere. Despite heightened security efforts.”[2]

The author then outlines the ten points which had been disseminated as well using the hash tag “Brussels raid” (ghazwa Bruksil) on Twitter while the document was released on Telegram. The ten points have to be read from a theological perspective from within the Sunni extremist ecosystem to understand the gravity and depth:

  1. The author describes Brussels as one of the main urban hubs where attacks against Muslims are organized. Addressing non-Muslims, the author asks, “isn’t Brussels the capital of the European Union which operates against Muslims? [This is] where hostile decision processes are undertaken against Muslims from within your [i.e. EU] territory.”
  1. Brussels was chosen furthermore as these decisions result in “you bombing Muslim civilians and innocent children, yet you claim to only target fighters of the Islamic State. Is an infant a grown male IS fighter and are the houses of civilians part of the barracks of the men of the Islamic State? Your mistakes in your war against the Islamic State have led you to dance in a cycle of death; for you are targeting unarmed civilians. Therefore, our response is proportionate to what you have done.” This reference is clear to those who are initiated into the Arabic-language dominated Sunni extremist mindset and ecosystem. It is a reference to Qur’an 16:126 as discussed only here in the framework of a just war against non-Muslim aggressors (as opposed to revenge operations within the sectarian war inside the Middle East). “You are the ones that started this wicked cycle of violence, God, exalted and might He is, says: “So if anyone commits transgression against you, attack him as he attacked you.”[3]

IS is part of the Sunni extremist tradition – and has to be considered within this context of an ocean of Arabic language Sunni extremist materials 

This divine equation of life – by jihadist standards – is not new or unique to ISIS. Yusuf al-‘Uyairi, former bin Laden bodyguard, first leader of al-Qa’ida in Saudi Arabia and prolific theologian published online in 2002 a 14-page long assessment of the hostage operation in Moscow by Chechen jihadists. In the wake of the hostage crisis at the musical “Ost-West” killing the hostages had been the last resort and not the main intention of this operation. Had this been at the center, the hostage-takers would have had lured the Russian Special Forces into the theater to kill as many as possible before starting to execute the hostages. “The Mujahideen do not desire to massacre civilians as the Russians do in Chechnya. For had this been the objective of previous operations then the Russian people would appreciate to a great extend the voices of the hardliners,[4] granting them to increase death and mayhem in Chechnya.”[5] Rather, as al-‘Uyairi outlined, the failure of “the Mujahideen to execute all hostages and likewise to blow up the building had not been their prime objective (…); killing the hostages was only a last resort for the Mujahideen.”[6] As

“the world is allied against the Chechen cause, America and Europe are in unison with Russia. When the Russians had been allowed [by their allies] to penetrate the territory of Georgia to fight the Mujahideen and the muhajireen, there had been no other option. All the states of the world remained silent regarding the massacres committed by the Russians in Chechnya. The Chechen people received no help at all from the world, neither mercy nor sympathy.”[7]

The right of self-defense, by all means, is the underlining justification. For how else could “the people of Chechnya defend themselves against the invaders[8] (or in the sense of the attack in Brussels: military aggressors that indiscriminately bomb targets in ISIS held territory) who came to their land, corrupting the religion and this world (al-din wa-l dunya).”[9] In the Russian context, al-‘Uyairi reasons any kidnapping and execution, any harm against the Russians as justified in the Qur’an and therefore as approved by shari’a law standards. He references Qur’an 2:194, but only the part suitable for his interpretation in the context of cloaking the ‘an-eye-for-an-eye’ equation in the divine language, as much as Umm Nusayba did in the 2016 document:

“So if anyone commits aggression against you, attack him as he attacked you, but be mindful of God.” (2:194)

Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, AQ leader in Iraq and the Godfather of IS used the very same part of the Qur’an to reason the kidnapping and execution of four staffers of the Russian embassy in Bagdad. The crimes committed in Chechnya and the Russian presence in Iraq had been the prime motivation to individually punish the members of the embassy for the Russian military engagement in the Caucasus – and ten years later to dispatch suicide bombers to attack critical infrastructure in Brussels and hit civilians.

Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, even though dead for over a decade, has left a substantial legacy. His speeches are from time to time featured in new IS videos and highlight the claim of fighting on behalf of the “prophetic methodology” that was conveyed by avantgardist fighters and leaders such as al-Zarqawi and others.

The reading of this particular verse is not only applied in the framework of kidnapping or executing individuals, but also to sanction greater attacks. As Abu Mus’ab al-Suri (Mustafa ‘Abd al-Qadir Sit Maryam Nasir), the alleged mastermind of the Madrid bombings (2004) wrote in an analysis to reason the London bombings in 2005,

“for our Qur’an and the sunna[10] of our prophet command us to refrain from killing women, children and pious men[11] devoted to religious worship, if they are clearly distinguished from men [of war] and have not fought [against Muslims]. However, the prophet commanded us to show hostility to those who committed aggression against us by committing the same aggression against them. Written in for you in the [holy] script is:

“so if anyone commits aggression against you, attack him as he attacked you.” This is a repetition of what had been prescribed for you in the Holy Script “an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.”[12] Our historical as well as contemporary scholars, however, decided that the enemies, when they have slain women, children, and non-combatants, it is our obligation to treat them likewise; compelling them to cease committing their crimes [and as deterrence]. This ruling is not just made by the scholars of the Mujahideen and the terrorists (irhabiyyin), but by all of the scholars, with the exception of the vermin and the apes of the munafiqin (hypocrites).”[13]

Al-Suri equates the tens of thousands killed in Iraq and Afghanistan to the deaths of 9/11:

“if we summon the death-toll of our two operations [9/11] to now [2005] as not more than 4,000 killed civilians since September 11th.”[14]

According to al-‘Uyairi, without any reference to works or scholars, the above mentioned parts of the Qur’an in it’s selective reading and interpretation are proof of sanctioning jihadist operations such as the Moscow theater siege, or as al-Suri related, to bomb the London public transportation. Or Brussels in 2016. For, in jihadist mindset,

“these verses are thoroughly discussed among the scholars [of Islam] and the like. In short, it is permissible for us to punish them as they punish us. For the Russians target innocent women and children, killing them intentionally and unabated. The Russian people are the ones supporting the military; they are the ones electing[15]them upon their nomination by the military hardliners. For if the people of Russia do not drink of the cup the Chechens have to drink of, for then they will not feel the bitterness. For if the Russians taste (dhaqa) the fire of war, then this will surely lead to the withdrawal of the peoples support for the operations of the army.”[16]

This is part of the basis of the partial reading of Qur’an 2:194 within the Sunni extremist ecosystem. All of the above-cited works are translated from Arabic. All writers had been native Arabic speakers and their works and actions continue to inspire the current as well as future generations of extremists. The readers of Umm Nusayba’s 2016 reaction to the March Brussels attack have most likely seen videos of al-Zarqawi killing hostages and at least parts of al-‘Uyairi’s work. This is part of the materials disseminated (either in full or partially) on Telegram, where Nusayba’s authoritative work, as published by ISIS official media al-Wafa’, has been released.

Ten Reasons to Attack Brussels (continued)

The third point is in particular relevant, as the growing polarization comes into play, roughly eight months after the refugee crisis hit Europe in the Summer of 2015.

  1. Brussels was attacked “as within your territory Muslims are threatened all the time and anywhere. Even up to the point of Christian extremist groups threatening Muslims in their mosques, turning them into targets and killing them. And your governments do nothing, turn a blind eye to these actions and do not refer to these acts as terrorism.” Umm Nusayba again references the above detailed parts of Qur’an 2:194 only in the active past tense: “therefore we have attack you as you have threatened and attacked (…).”
  2. “You have insulted our messenger – peace and blessings upon him – in your capital. You have sprayed graffiti insulting Muslims on their mosques and hung pictures of pigs as well on the mosques in your capital. [Belgian] Muslims organized demonstrations to have these attacks prohibited and those responsible punished. Your government has done nothing. And you believe we will forget the insults of our prophet? By God, never! And be it ten years later, we will and always will avenge our prophet and our mosques. Wherever our prophet has been insulted, we will strike in revenge. This is reason enough to conduct raids against you and wipe you out completely by nuclear weapons. You do not understand the depth of our love for our prophet. When the time is right, we will get even.”
  3. “For you imprison the virtuous, pure, chaste Muslimas or have you forgotten what you have done to our sister Malika [El-Aroud]?[17] You even took away her citizenship, all she did was marry a man who is a mujahid and tell the story about You took away her citizenship because she is a Muslima and you despise her Islam (…) while you make decisions to combat Muslims. (…) you may have forgotten her, we haven’t. Neither have we forgotten her sisters of the pure, virtuous Muslimas that are imprisoned by your hands. We have avenged them.”
  4. We attacked Brussels “for you imprison our men such as [the Paris master mind] Salah ‘Abd al-Salam, until when will he be held in prison? He did not attack your country and out of passion for France you arrested him. Don’t you understand that we are passionate for our imprisoned brothers (…)?”
  5. “The pressure on Muslims and the ban of the hijab as ruled by the Belgian courts. Likewise, the ban of the hijab in schools. You claim religious freedom and women’s rights, yet it does not apply to Muslims and their interests. You have forfeited your every principle and philosophy. (…) you assume Muslims are weak[18] and can be oppressed as you please, we, however, will not forget and therefore we have struck in revenge.”
  6. “You lie. Your media lies. You accuse Muslims of injustice and enmity. Even in the weakest phases [of the history] you repeat these accusations against them. You in your lies are misguiding people and frame Islam as a religion of savagery (…). Yet you switch the truth and take no responsibility for perpetrating crimes on Muslim soil and occupying it (…).”
  7. “We have been commanded to combat [non-Muslim] people until they confess “there is no God but God and Muhammad is the messenger of God.” (…) as reported by Ibn ‘Umar, the messenger of God – peace and blessings upon him – said: “I am ordered to combat the people until they confess there is no God but God and Muhammad is the messenger of God; and they profess the prayer and give zakat. For if they do this, then I will restrain myself of their blood and their possessions, except for what is rightfully to be claimed by Islam and by their account for God.”

This statement made by prophet Muhammad is cited from time to time in the Sunni extremist ecosystem to justify attacks and to emphasize their absolute claim of fighting for the absolute Islamization of the world. Umm Nusayba references the source of this hadith as conveyed by al-Bukhari 17/1, number 25 and Muslim 53/1, number 22. The same hadith has been used by one of the key theologians for the AQ driven resistance in Iraq at the time while being a core member of AQAP in Saudi Arabia. In an article by ‘Abdallah bin Muhammad al-Rushud for the first bi-weekly electronic al-Qa’ida magazine, Sawt al-jihad (“the Voice of Jihad”), he cites the hadith in an article on the viewpoint of “shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyya” to theologically outline the justification for violent acts in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere. In a second article, he states this hadith as the commandment to “combat people in general without discrimination as long as your objective is that they enter Islam.”[19] Umm Nusayba continues:

“I bring the joyful news to you that this religion will engulf the whole world (…). By God, we do not fight but to raise the speech of God and to spread justice among the people. There is no distinguishing between Arab and non-Arab, except for God-fearingness and piety, no white is more worth than black, except for piety.”

  1. “Our amir, our caliph, our leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi – may God protect him – has promised you revenge. He keeps his word and does not issue empty threats. Has he not promised revenge to anyone harming Muslims? Has he not told every taghut and their allies “for by God, we will avenge, by God, we will avenge and if it takes years.”[20] What is to come, will be more devastating and bitter.[21] His soldiers, operatives and followers are everywhere, waiting for the right time (…). We pledged loyalty and his orders are as [decisive] as a sword on our necks.”

The outlook that “Muslims are not being returned to the status they have been in the past” concludes the document. Because now there is an organized Sunni representation that is “a state and a caliph which is for Muslims, which won’t be destroyed as you would like to see it.” The greatest success ISIS reclaims is the conquest of territory and the consolidation under a formalistic rule of law, that is shari’a law by the most hardcore and extreme interpretation thereof – besides Saudi Arabia. By basing the legitimacy of rule on literally hundreds of thousands of historical writings of theological nature ISIS claims an Islamic statehood on highly coherent principles. Attacks in Brussels and elsewhere are framed as “state” foreign policy in the sense of western governments having formed an anti-ISIS coalition in combination with military action against the group in Syria and Iraq in particular. The “statehood” of ISIS is based theological literature – past and present. Authors in this repository, which is freely accessible online to anyone having the Arabic language skills needed and the openness to initiate into this engulfing, state of mind.[22]This ranges from Ibn Taymiyya to Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab as well as ‘intermediary theologians’ that had been key functionaries for the ‘classical’ al-Qa’ida – such as Yusuf bin Salih al-‘Uyairi or ‘Abdallah bin Muhammad al-Rushud. The application of this state of mind, embodied by the “Islamic State” and projected to the outside via social media in over two thousand official videos makes this Sunni extremist project one that has come true – and that is worth fighting for. In a simplified definition, ISIS represents the abode of Islam (dar al-Islam), promising “grievances for western states caused by lone lions who have assaulted them, penetrating deep in their flesh without mercy.”[23] For ISIS the war, despite territorial losses, is won. It has set the “correct creed as a seed in the minds of thousands of Muslims inside and outside of Syria and Iraq. Giving birth to a new generation on the grounds of the holy book and the sword.”[24]

[1] The “tyrants” as outlined in the previous chapters; the reference is commonly used for defined un-Islamic rulers in the Middle East and also references western governments who are engaged in a new crusade against Islam.

[2] Umm Nusayba, “’ashara asbab bayyina l-ghazwi Brussels al-‘asima”, al-Wafa’, March 25, 2016. Obtained on Telegram.

[3] Qur’an 2:194

[4] Lit.: “increase the  voices of men of war”.

[5] Yusuf al-‘Uyairi, ‘Amaliyya “masrah Moscow” madha rabiha ‘l-Mujahideen minha wa-madha khasiru?, 5-6.

[6] Yusuf al-‘Uyairi, ‘Amaliyya “masrah Moscow” madha rabiha ‘l-Mujahideen minha wa-madha khasiru?, 5.

[7] Yusuf al-‘Uyairi, ‘Amaliyya “masrah Moscow” madha rabiha ‘l-Mujahideen minha wa-madha khasiru?, 6.

[8] Lit.: “repelling the attacking aggressor”, daf’a al-‘adu al-sa’il. This is a reference to Ibn Taymiyya and also a slogan that was used in the Sawt al-Jihad magazine of the first generation al-Qa’ida branch in Saudi Arabia where al-‘Uyairi had been a core media member and its first leader.

[9] Yusuf al-‘Uyairi, ‘Amaliyya “masrah Moscow” madha rabiha ‘l-Mujahideen minha wa-madha khasiru?, 5.

[10] In the meaning of “tradition” but in the jihadist mindset as the role model for the proper conduct of “customary procedures.”

[11] Lit.: “men of religion” (rijal al-din).

[12] A reference to parts of Qur’an 5:45:

“In the Torah we prescribed for them a life for a life, an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, an equal wound for a wound.”

[13] Abu Mus’ab al-Suri. “Risala ila al-Britaniyyin wa-Europiyyin sha’ban wa-hukumat bi-sha’n tafjirat London”, July 2005, al-muqawamat al-Islamiyyat al-‘alimiyyat, 35.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Lit.: “giving their endorsement to them”.

[16] Yusuf al-‘Uyairi, ‘Amaliyya “masrah Moscow” madha rabiha ‘l-Mujahideen minha wa-madha khasiru?, 7.

[17] The story of Malika El-Aroud and her husband is available in the interview by Florian Flade: “Das Leben und Sterben des Moez Garsallaoui”, OJihad blog, October 17, 2012,

https://ojihad.wordpress.com/2012/10/17/das-leben-und-sterben-des-moez-garsallaoui/

[18] mustada’ifin

[19] ‘Abdallah bin Muhammad al-Rushud, “al-muqassid al-thani min muqasid al-jihad: al-da’wa ila llah” Sawt al-Jihad number 18.

[20] Risala ila al-mujahidin wa-l umma al-Islamiyya fi shahr Ramadan li-amir al-mu’minin Abu Bakr al-Husayni al-Qurashi al-Baghdadi, Mu’assassat al-Furqan, Ramadan 3, 1435.

[21] This is a slogan that was utilized by ISIS in the wake of the attacks in Paris, November 2015. Videos released by wilayat Homs in November 2015 show French foreign fighters responding to the attack. The same media tactic was repeated shortly after the attacks occurred in March 2016 in Brussels (w. al-Raqqa, March 26).

[22] Worldview might come to mind from a a-religious western angle, yet it would neglect the appeal of physical-spiritual life in this world and the continuation of one’s existence in the ‘afterlife’ and paradise.

[23] Mu’awiyya al-Baghdadi, “madha jana al-tahaluf al-duwwali khilal akthar min ‘amayn min harbihi dudd al-dawlat al-Islamiyya, Mu’assassat Ashhad, May 2, 2017.

[24] Ibid.

Part 7: How does IS use Telegram to recruit European foreign fighters and terrorists?

Posted October 10, 2017 by Nico Prucha
Categories: Attacks in Europe, ISIS, online jihad, Theology of Violence

part 7 header

Throughout the Summer of 2016 apparent lone wolf attackers struck in France, Germany, Russia[1] and the U.S. The attackers acted on behalf of the “Islamic State” and in most cases selfie-styled videos had been made and uploaded to IS media operatives of Amaq Agency (wakalat al-‘Amaq). The short videos followed a classical Jihadist modus operandi, with the exception that these had not been foreign fighters, but rather either local French, American citizens, or as in the case of Germany, refugees from Syria or Afghanistan. Omar Mateen, U.S. citizen born in America, attacked a night club in Orland, Florida in June 2016, leaving 49 people dead and 53 injured.[2] Jihadist users on Telegram had been quick to disseminate pictures of Omar Mateen – after these had been released by the mainstream media – to praise the attacker as a martyr and a “soldier of the caliphate.” A trend on Telegram quickly emerged to refer to such attacks under the hashtag “in your homes”, a reference to the jihadist understanding of the division of world into “dar al-Islam” (abode of Islam) and “dar al-kuffar” (abode of disbelievers). As French, American and other nation’s combat aircraft continue to bomb IS, the “dar al-Islam”, IS seeks to inspire and theologically guide attackers such as Omar Mateen to conduct revenge operations in the “depth of your abodes” (fi ‘aqr diyarikum), as the Arabic hashtag for “in your homes” advocates. Whatever the jihadists produce for publication, always is theologically coherent.

The Syrian refugee who failed undertaking a suicide bombing attack in Anspach, Germany, as well as the Afghan refugee who at random stabbed passengers on train in the region of Würzburg had filmed their final statements beforehand. These statements are – just like the 9/11 “martyr’s” videotaped farewell message or the 7/7 bombing attackers last words – the testimony (wasiyya) as much as a legacy. Allegedly, Telegram was used to communicate from within the caliphate with at least some of the attackers who then in turn used the app to upload their self-filmed wasiyya. This video was then edited and branded with the Amaq logo and released to the IS Telegram community with the intention that the swarm with fan it out to other online sites and platforms for maximum visibility.

The value of continuing its successful influence operation has driven IS on Telegram to dedicate media channels and media operatives to translating and producing new content for a specific French, German, Italian, English, Russian, and Bahasa Indonesia audience. All of these non-Arabic materials are theologically coherent with the universe of over 30 years of Sunni jihadist writings and videos. This is not new, and was also part of AQ’s strategy to draw potential recruits in via the Internet, but IS has formalized the process having the advantage of time, money, territory and dedicated resources to elevate this process. This has led to a two-fold production line: (i) official and (ii) user generated content. Together, these packages carry a range of messages which focus on the importance of the individual to take action. They highlight the ethos captured in the ‘Open Source Jihad’ as set by AQ’s English language magazine “Inspire” where barriers to entry are low and anyone can contribute. For example, they encourage individuals to realise that not all attacks have to be complex coordinated operations, nor use sophisticated weaponry, nor focus on a specific high profile target. Instead they articulate that anyone can strike a blow for the Islamic State. A video, for example, published by IS in April 2015 entitled “Hunt the Safavids” a French suicide bomber speaking in French (with Arabic subtitles) eulogises Muhammad Merah, the Toulouse shooter and clearly phrases what ideologues have authoritatively stated for many years: hijrah is an obligation, however if one cannot physically join jihadist movements in the Middle East and elsewhere, attacks are a legitimate substitute. Both actions grant the individual entry to paradise, the objective that drives Sunni extremists worldwide.

On November 26, 2016, IS released a video in French with Arabic subtitles. The video was published by Furat Media, a dedicated IS-media institution that produces content for non-Arab(ic) audience. As always video is in 16:9, full high definition, and features eulogies and praise for the span of lone wolf attackers in 2016. The film, entitled “Sur leur pas”  demonstrates vividly how IS uses and perceives Telegram for their purposes.

Part 6 sur leur pas furat.jpg

Screenshots of the video highlighting attacks, assailants and encrypted communication on Telegram.

Assailants are introduced and areas of attacks highlighted. Combined with mainstream media footage of respective attacks, IS boosts these as revenge operations and part of the “Islamic State” ‘foreign policy.’ Telegram chat exchanges claim to ‘document’ that some of the aspiring IS fighters had expressed the wish to conduct the hijra and join IS, but had been warned this being to dangerous. Rather, their intention can be translated into conducting attacks in their home countries instead of risking arrest for seeking to emigrate to Syria or Iraq. The final screen shows an elder Arab man crying over the death of his family and destruction of his home as a consequence of coalition bombing sorties against IS. A young man with his side arm ready watches the French language subtitled Arabic video and then shuts his MacBook to exercise revenge and restore dignity for the Sunni Muslim community.

[1] Thomas Joscelyn, Jihadists who Attacked Russian Police Appear in Islamic State Video, The Long War Journal, August 18, 2016,

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/08/jihadists-who-attacked-russian-police-appear-in-islamic-state-video.php

[2] Lizette Alvarez et al, Orlando Gunman was ‘Cool and Calm’ After Massacre, Police say, The New York Times, June 13, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/14/us/orlando-shooting.html?_r=0.

Part 6: Substituting the Jihadist Twittersphere for Islamic State Telegrams

Posted October 10, 2017 by Nico Prucha
Categories: online jihad, Social Media Sunni Extremist Activism, Uncategorized

part 6 sub TW4TG

Telegram offers privacy and encryption, allowing users to interact using their mobile devices (tablets and smart-phones) as well as laptop and desktop computers. It offers as a secure environment where sharing content is very easy. This includes the option to download large files directly via the Telegram application instead of having to open an external link in a browser to access the new videos and word documents. According to Telegram, the application is a cloud-based instant messaging service, providing optional end-to-end-encrypted messaging. It is free and open, having an “open API and protocol free for everyone,”[1] while having no limits on how much data individual users can share.

Media savvy IS members and sympathizers then took to Telegram where in the meantime, via hundreds of channels, often more than 50,000 Telegram messages are pushed out each week.

Telegram is being used to share content produced by ‘official’ IS channels. As had been the case on Twitter – and as is the nature of online jihad on social media sites – such content is enriched and enhanced by media supporters from within ISIS held territory as well as sympathizers worldwide. The output is mainly in Arabic whereas dedicated linguist and translation departments ensure a global audience is reached. Telegram is being used as a formal communication channel by a range of content aggregators within the movement, rolling out the official IS videos from the various provinces to word and PDF documents released by a rich blend of media agencies, such as al-Battar, al-Wafa’, Ashhad, al-Hayyat and many more.

A media group by the name Horizon (Mu’assassat Afaaq) established itself as a new IS media wing to provide sympathizers advice and tutorials on online security and encryption. This is a current trend and highlights that user security on mobile devices, encryption and general awareness is raising. This chatter on Telegram, arguably, also led ‘classic’ IS media newspapers to pick up this trend and put an emphasis on the “electronic war”, enemy capabilities and operational security advice for IS members and sympathizers.[2]

ISIS overview

Sunni Jihadists and in particular IS have a passion to publish and disseminate pictures, conveying coded notions, sentiments and passions. The “Gazwa” channel on Telegram sees itself in the tradition of the classical horseback riding ‘hit-and-run’ warrior, independent of a fixed base or camp.

Following the classical understanding of conducting raids in the desert – as visualized in  the execution video addressed earlier, the jihadists on Telegram perceive  themselves as a coordination point for raids (ghazawat). These ghazawat are orchestrated on Telegram and then pushed into other social media platforms. Telegram is central to the supply of text for Tweets, disseminating new hashtags, the timing of such raids, and the flooding of comments on Facebook pages and so on. IS media operatives and sympathizers miss Twitter and even from IS official media outlets a return has been demanded – fearing that da’wa on Telegram just being among like-minded people will not work, as outlined in a future part.[3]

Hence, Arabic transcribed keywords in Latin such as “ghazwa” play a major role, and help to identify content quickly and sign up for new jihadist related channels on Telegram and elsewhere. As visualized above – taken from the IS channel Ghazwa on Telegram, the transliteration can vary especially after channels are being suspended.

During the attacks in March 2016 in Brussels, IS media operatives on Telegram prepared French language Tweets with hashtags used at the time of the attack to maximize the reach of pro-IS Tweets. Likewise, other social media platforms are affected by such “social media raids.” By the time such accounts are deleted on Twitter and elsewhere, IS has a new event-driven operation backed by social media raids. As had been the case on Twitter, Telegram is now the main hub for IS to share content reposting from Twitter, other social media such as YouTube, vimeo, DailyMotion, SendVid and Facebook, as well as websites containing IS propaganda, including those hosted on wordpress.com.

The multi-lingual strategic outreach and communication approach is clear: targeting non-Arabic speaking potential recruits in the West remains a high priority of IS while maintaining and ensuring the steady uninterrupted production and dissemination of Arabic content (targeting Arab native speakers worldwide).

Part 6 Telegram operation wide network

Multi-dimension outreach strategy: orchestrating an influence operation during the March 2016 Brussels attack, calling for a “Twitter Campaign”. French-language pro-IS tweets to be copy-and-pasted onto Twitter accounts that will be abandoned shortly after, using respective French mainstream hashtags to inject pro-IS messages into general networks. This method is also used to ensure content moves from Telegram where it is only visible to channel members onto open platforms such as YouTube, Instagram, or blogs such as WordPress.

 

 

[1] www.telegram.org

[2]  Ali Fisher, Swarmcast: How Jihadist Networks Maintain a Persistent Online Presence, Perspectives on Terrorism, 2015, http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/426/html

[3] Al-Naba’ Magazina no. 54.

Part 5: Influence and information campaigns: from Twitter to Telegram

Posted September 17, 2017 by Nico Prucha
Categories: online jihad, Social Media Sunni Extremist Activism

Header IS Briefing Part 2

The theology of al-Qa’ida (AQ) and subsequently of the “Islamic State” (IS) and its ability to propagate that theology as a monopoly of truth through professional promotion and marketing material disseminated via modern communication technology has proven to be its most resilient foundation and greatest innovation. This Jihadist media activism is evident and strengthens this resilience on a daily basis with new audio-visual and written propaganda uploaded from a number of conflict zones, in numerous languages, to a wide range of online social platforms and multimedia channels.

In the West, policy makers are struggling to cope with the massive quantity and often times high quality productions issued by groups such IS who continue to draw in new recruits from western societies each month. Although slowly recognized by policy-makers that the so-called “counter narratives” are failing, as outlined in a New York Times article 2015.[1] IS has proven it’s resilience on the battlefield and the West has so far employed half-hearted “counter-narratives”, that usually neither touch on the Arabic propaganda content nor the messages conveyed by non-Arab foreign fighters who explain their reasons for joining the cause in their own words. Due to the tactical focus of both “counter-narratives” and takedowns, the U.S. and its Western allies are being drawn into open warfare online, on a battlefield chosen by their jihadist adversaries. And it is those jihadists who will thrive in the chaos that results. As outlined with Ali Fisher in the article “ISIS is Winning the Online Jihad Against the West” for The Daily Beast in October 2014 , the ideology/theology of IS, offering a coherent worldview while gaining and consolidating territory, has proven time and again to be resilient on all layers on the Internet.[2]

As of 2017, with the partial loss of territory and the de-population of Sunni urban centers in Syria and Iraq as a consequence, IS has withdrawn to the countryside, to continue the fight – and to maintain and upkeep their greatest weapon: media work as means of long-term influence and resistance.

From 2011 onwards, the main layer for Sunni jihadists online was Twitter, in addition to Facebook and YouTube, especially since the outbreak of violence in Syria. This propagation effort by the so-called “media mujahidin” has been approved and sanctioned by lmovement leaders, and now contributes to the interconnected jihadist zeitgeist.[3] For example, jihadist groups had been using Twitter to disseminate links to video content shot on the battlefield in Syria and posted for mass consumption on YouTube.[4] Since 2011, members of jihadist forums have issued media strategies that encourage the development of media mujahidin. This encouragement has been accompanied by the release of guides to using social media platforms, which often included lists of recommended accounts to follow.[5] With relatively little effort, IS was able to maintain massive networks on Twitter. This gave the media operations a whole new and unprecedented situation: releasing videos from within what is defined as “Islamic territory”, liberated from their enemies to a massive number of active or passive followers.[6]

Twitter did an excellent job in preventing IS from upkeeping their massive networks, despite the commitment and dedication of some of the media mujahidin to re-open in some cases hundreds of new accounts. This changed when Twitter became more effective at banning IS content by adjusting their spam settings, severely weakening the jihadist’ network on their platform. The degradation of IS networks on Twitter led many Western observers on Twitter to believe IS in general is in decline. However, while the ‘Twitter ship’ was sinking for IS, the online swarm simply turned to a new social media platform.

Early 2016 we witnessed a massive shift from Twitter to Telegram among IS militants and sympathizers. Until then IS was able to maintain a persistent network on Twitter, despite a massive rate of account suspensions. Because media mujahidin are highly dedicated – as much as they are on the battlefield – IS Twitter users usually reappeared on the platform using a different account – once they had been banned. From a user perspective, all you needed to be aware of was a good set of Arabic and non-Arabic key words to find IS content on Twitter, and then start following the  accounts. At the same time, the IS network on Twitter was not taken down at once, and the remaining accounts keenly promoted the new Twitter handles of those who came back.

With the massive move to Telegram, where IS now has settled in full, Twitter is used as a secondary platform to post specific – not all – content. On Telegram IS users and sympathizers are among themselves and in order to initiate new members, these have to undergo a process of vetting or simply have to know the Arabic theology after being invited to a couple channels to manually get into the deeper networks.

The community has migrated from Twitter to Telegram, yet Twitter is used by the community to stage “media raids” from Telegram. This is not about community building, rather it is about posting current event driven content on Twitter and by the time these temporary accounts are either taken down or obsolete otherwise, IS has new event driven content that is then pushed into Twitter and elsewhere from the IS core on Telegram.

[1] Mark Mazzetti and Michael R. Gordon, ISIS is Winning the Social Media War, U.S. Concludes, The New York Times, June 13, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/13/world/middleeast/isis-is-winning-message-war-us-concludes.html?_r=0

[2] Ali Fisher and Nico Prucha, ISIS is Winning the Online Jihad Against the West, The Daily Beast, October 1, 2014, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/10/01/isis-is-winning-the-online-jihad-against-the-west.html

[3] Al-Manhajiyya fi tahsil al-khibra al-i’lamiyya, Mu’assasat al-Furqan & Markaz al-Yaqin, part 1,” Markaz al-Yaqin and al-Furqan, May 2011. Two jihadist media departments from Iraq published this Arabic language handbook, part of a greater series. Jihadist activity is sanctioned through the existing core fatwa (authoritative religious ruling or decrees) based on historical scholars such as Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328), the famous Hanbali scholar, and enriched by the senior leadership of al-Qaida and now ISIS. Thus, any local jihadist, al-Qaida- or ISIS-affiliated action can fall under this umbrella approbation, thus increasing its appeal. See Prem Mahadevan, “The Glocalisation of al-Qaedaism,” Center for Security Studies, 22 March 2013.

[4] Ali Fisher and Nico Prucha, “Tweeting for the Caliphate: Twitter as the New Frontier for Jihadist Propaganda”, CTC Sentinel, June 2013, West Point.

[5] Discussed in Ali Fisher and Nico Prucha, “Jihadi Twitter Activism – Introduction”; Nico Prucha, “Online Territories of Terror – Utilizing the Internet for Jihadist Endeavors,” Orient 4 (2011). Members of the Ansar al-Mujahidin forum and Shumukh al-Islam have posted advice encouraging fellow users to develop social media profiles to disseminate their message to a wider group of users. See, for example: “The Twitter Guide: the Most Important Jihadi Users and Support Accounts for Jihad and the Mujahideen on Twitter:” http://www.shamikh1.info/vb/showthread.php?t=192509

[6] For a discussion on the themes of content and networks, including visualized Twitter IS networks:

Ali Fisher, Nico Prucha, Turning up the volume to 11 is not enough: Why counter-strategies have to target extremist clusters, Jihadica, February 9, 2015,

http://www.jihadica.com/turning-the-volume-up-to-11-is-not-enough-why-counter-strategies-have-to-target-extremist-clusters/

Ali Fisher, Nico Prucha, Turning up the volume to 11 is not enough: Networks of influence and ideological coherence, Jihadica, and March 23 2015,

http://www.jihadica.com/turning-the-volume-up-to-11-is-not-enough-part-2-networks-of-influence-and-ideological-coherence/