Archive for the ‘Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)’ category

Salil al-Sawarim, parts 2 (2012) and 3 (2013) – making the Islamic state

January 14, 2018

Part of the Salil al-Sawarim mini series – a blast from the past of pre-IS/ISIS materials that are of grave importance to the IS ecosystem and the framework of Sunni extremism.


Any Sunni jihadist video incorporates elements and theological ‘narratives’ (question of habitus) that are visualized and implemented for their target audience – that target audience is Arabic native speakers who ideally understand substrates of Sunni extremism having been brought up within a Sunni Arab habitus. Sunni extremism has a text rich history and tradition as outlined before that predates IS and goes back to the first organized manifestation of Sunni extremism in Afghanistan in the early 1980s. Already in the 1980s, when hand drawn maps and black and white photographs enhanced Arabic type written magazines, within the jihadist mindset Afghanistan was carved out of wilayat – that then became known to a broader audience due to IS media work and non-Arab foreign fighters addressing their target audiences in their native languages. Yet, with the majority of Sunni extremist materials being broadcast to an Arab target audience above all others – as the Sunni extremist movement is dominated by Arab members – the overwhelming majority of (online) releases by Sunni extremists in general are in Arabic and all non-Arabic media items have references to originally Arabic language writings.


Salil al-Sawarim 2 (SAS2) shows fighters conducting hit-and-run missions, infiltrating Iraqi cities, such as Hit, Ramadi, or Haditha to capture and execute Iraqi counter-terrorist or government officials, and then withdrawing to the remote desert.

This modus operandi was a common theme for AQ in Iraq that morphed into the Islamic State today – with al-Furqan over the past decade and a half regularly releasing videos of hit-and-run missions, IED strikes on US vehicles, sniper attacks and hostages. While the 2012 and 2013 parts of Salil al-Sawarim videos highlighted pre-ISIS capability to undertake hit-and-run strikes disguised as Iraqi SWAT and police units, the 2014 release of the fourth part sought to document.

It is important to understand the full framework of Sunni extremism to comprehend the dynamics at work in the Arab world in particular as of 2018.Major video releases such as the four Salil al-Sawarim are the core of the post-2014 video productions of IS – showing the implementation of the “prophetic methodology”, the systematic execution of Shiites in Iraq (and later Yezides and bringing that mindset to Syria to combat the Alawite dominated Syrian army), the use of stolen Iraqi government police uniforms to infiltrate and kill as many as possible, the systematic intel-styled rooting ouf of high value targets; the coerced repentance of Sunnis in IS “liberated” areas, who have/had not other choice but to join or submit to ISIS – and who are now faced as of 2018 with a new wave of deadly sectarianism by the new forceful rule of Shiite militias driving their own agenda; the visualized concept of theological and historical coherent elements such as inghimas and shuhada’; the personal messages of (foreign) fighters addressing their Arab target audience in modern colloqiual Arabic to project Islamic knowledge in a preacher styled religious-authoritative setting and by thus are far more powerful and convincing than al-Zawahiri reading a script of the screen; all of these examplorary elements are tied to hundreds and hundreds of pages of Arabic text – historical as well as contemporary crafted by Sunni extremist key writers – and resonate within the Arab target audience and allow new members to initiate into this movement.

The second video also introduces footage that would become commonplace in “Islamic State” propaganda: a professionally-laid out shooting range where many masked men are training. The weapons shown include the classic Kalashnikov assault rifle, as well as the much glorified – and often seen in jihadist videos – Pulemyot Kalashnikova (P.K.) heavy machine gun. SAS2 is more sophisticated than its prequel; the attacks by the Mujahidin appear more precise, professional and deadly. SAS2 emphasizes the importance of media work, featuring an IS media operative preparing crates of DVDs to give out to Sunnis in the towns and cities that will be attacked but not immediately occupied.

A Mujahid is interviewed and introduced as a “soldier of the Islamic State”. Iraqi cars, gear and elite police SWAT equipment are handed out to the graduates of the training course.


A Mujahid in full SWAT gear gives an interview; apparently looted SWAT boots and uniforms being handed out

The video also features action footage in various towns and cities at night. Iraqi soldiers and policemen approach IS fighters disguised in special police uniforms to greet them, believing they are comrades, only to be executed.

Those who IS considers high-value targets, predominantly collaborators and Sahwa officers, are at the centre of the film. The film showcases IS laying the groundwork to eventually take over the territory cleansed of functionaries loyal to the central Iraqi government.

A blog named “Islamic News Agency – da’wa al-haqq” described the second SAS movie as a documentary in Full HD, with 49 minutes of IS fighters in special counter-terrorism vehicles conducting assaults in various cities and killing dozens of Iraqi soldiers.


The third video of the Salil al-sawarim series was released on January 17, 2013. By this time, the “Islamic State” was seeking to consolidate control of territory in Iraq and the purpose of SAS3 was to document its proclaimed campaign Hadim al-aswar (“take down the walls!”).

The video opens with a band of Mujahidin singing and the film is introduced as:

“a new phase in the conduct of jihadi operations, starting in the beginning of Ramadan, a.H. 1433. The Mujahidin have arisen anew and returned to areas from which they had previously withdrawn. This film is a documentary of some of the military operations in this important and historical phase for jihadist work in Iraq.”

The campaign “take down the walls” consisted of systematic attacks on prisons and had two strategic objectives:

  1. Exacting revenge for Sunnis, perceived as excluded, marginalized and persecuted by the ruling Shiite majority of Iraq;
  2. Replenishing fighter ranks with freed inmates who have little choice but to support and join IS.

The official banner of the al-Furqan release in the light of the campaign “take down the walls!”

SAS3 features freed inmates of the Tasfirat prison in Tikrit who have assumed or resumed leadership roles within IS. These men inform the audience of the hardship and torture endured in prison while relaying theological interpretations framed within the need to act.

The Sunni community is repeatedly portrayed as driven to extinction by Iranian-backed Shiites and Western enmity. In addition, every IS armed operation is framed as an altruistic act for the Sunnis in Iraq and Syria.

The specific Sunni extremist interpretation of the Qur’an and the Hadith are put in practice; for example, a Mujahid issues a call to prayer while standing next to slain enemies. Such footage is intended to portray IS as the only Sunni group willing to resist the Shiite takeover of Iraq and Syria.

The 80-minute long SAS3 concludes with a massive suicide bombing attack on an Iraqi army barracks near or in Mosul, undertaken by a Tunisian foreign fighter. He is identified as Abu Ziyyad al-Bahhar “from Tunis, the Muslim city where real men are made.” He describes his emigration (hijra) into Syria and then Iraq in 2013 and claims he did not face any problems while traveling. Using classical Sunni extremist rhetoric, he urges others to follow his example:

“This is not the end of the path – no (…) Many of our brothers have spent many years in prison (…). Hijra, jihad, hardships and combat; being imprisoned, blood, flesh [and sacrifice], this is the path. This is the path of Muhammad.”

The “Islamic State” is the first Islamist movement to make highly professional use of the Internet for “missionary purposes” (da’wa) related to territory seized from sovereign states and having had the ability to control these for a longer time. The control of strategic towns and even huge cities such as Mosul, parts of Ramadi (2014-2015), Fallujah, and Raqqa, the capital of the “Caliphate”, allowed IS media workers to continuously produce new video propaganda from both the ‘hinterland’ as well as the frontlines.

This enabled jihadist media strategists to convey several messages; firstly, they showcase IS members building and maintaining critical infrastructure for civilians, while fighting, bleeding and dying for their altruistic project on the frontlines. They also show IS fighting a rich blend of enemies, including air force raids by the “crusader alliance” and various Shiite, Kurdish and Christian militias on the ground. These sequences are intended to convey a sizeable Islamic state populated by people who have adopted a real Muslim identity.

This is a legacy new and less initiated members can quickly come to terms with: what are we fighting for (as was outlined by al-‘Utaybi in 2006 or Abu Hamza al-Baghdadi in 2005).

The dangerous difference is that a secret and hidden mindset comprising of over thousands of pages written in Arabic by AQ and later enriched by IS “scholars” is available – mostly unchallenged – online that showcases and demonstrates in often times humble and honest words by men who have bled and died for their beliefs, why any “true” Sunni Muslim should follow their path and reclaim violently territory lost by IS and/or attack clearly theologically defined enemies as legitimate to attack worldwide.

IS ecosystem: Salil al-Sawarim (2012)

January 1, 2018

Part of the Salil al-Sawarim series

The first part of Salil al-sawarim (SAS1) was released by “Islamic State in Iraq” (ISI) in 2012. After al-Qaeda in Iraq consolidated control over the Sunni province of al-Anbar, it declared the establishment of ISI, al-dawlat al-Iraq al-Islamiyya – in October 2006. Al-Anbar province has an extensive border with Syria that includes the Syrian town of Minbaj, which became one of the main hubs for cross-border activity and which was later conquered by IS and lost in late 2016.

SAS1 features a rich blend of “narratives” that have formed an integral part of Sunni extremist identity since the U.S. occupation of Iraq in 2003/4. SAS1 features several prominent jihadist figures, including IS godfather Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi and IS spokesman Abu Muhammad al-‘Adnani. The video portrays the Shiites as mere agents and henchmen of the Americans and shows a number of attacks on police posts and individuals accused of apostasy and collaboration – a signpost of what would increase in scale and pace leading to 2014, the declaration of the caliphate – as well as to mid-2017 with the increasing loss of territory and the return to the old tactics.


Salil al-Sawarim 1 fostering sectarian tensions and praising the “Islamic State” Godfather Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi

The first film features two sequences that would later become “Islamic State” modus operandi, and appear prominently in SAS4. The first type of sequence depicts well-planned, well-organized and well-executed rapid attacks on police and army checkpoints in urban and remote areas of the country. For example, the film shows fighters killing uniformed officers in Baghdad in hit-and-run and execution-style shootings. The film uses audio recordings of Abu Muhammad al-‘Adnani or Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi to justify these killings – a common example of how speeches of even long deceased figures of influence matter to the movement to date. The second type of sequence shows fighters raiding army outposts in remote areas. The aftermath of these attacks is also shown, including close-ups of dead Iraqi soldiers as proof of the success of the Sunni extremists – something that has in the second half of 2017 intensified again with the loss of territory and the systematic attacks on remote and undermanned outposts in the Iraqi desert.

In other parts of SAS1, suicide bombers give their testimony (wasiyya) while crude bombs and handgun silencers are proudly shown as “industrial produce of the State for the oppressed,” whom IS claims to be fighting for. Sniper scenes are an integral part of the first SAS movie, as in SAS4.

The post 2014 IS weapons workshops as a game changer on the battlefields is outlined in this article here.

SAS1 features a coherent blend of elements of Iraqi-based Sunni extremist theology, notably the theoretical offer to fellow Sunni Muslims, including those in the ranks and service of the Iraqi army, police and government, to repent (tawba) and become “true” Muslims again. This form of repentance and inclusion is important throughout the series, but reaches a climax in the fourth SAS video, which shows the mass repentance of Sunnis in areas that IS conquered in Iraq in early 2014.

This is a form of applied theology, an idea that originated with AQ, though it lacked the territory to fulfil its implementation. By contrast, SAS1 features former Sahwa (“Awakening Council”) soldiers repenting and joining IS while its spokesman, Abu Muhammad al-‘Adnani, calls on all Sunnis to renounce their loyalty to the Iraqi Shiite-led government of al-Maliki.

A targeted assassination in SAS1 set the precursor for what was about to hit Iraq, in particular the region of al-Anbar and the cities of Fallujah, Ramadi, Mosul and smaller towns such as Hit. And it is this exact modus operandi that IS has, as of 2018, reverted to with the strategy of denying their enemies a long-term prospect of controlling the terrority that was lost by IS according the the themes of the video and written propaganda released since August 2016.

SAS1 also features a speech by Abu Muhammad al-‘Adnani entitled “we renew our invitation (da’wa) to every apostate, traitor and deviant to repent and to return [to the state of being a Sunni Muslim.” This offer is especially directed at “policemen and Sahwa members” and ceases to be valid when IS overpowers or captures them. According to jihadist reasoning, repentance can only be considered sincere and potentially accepted if the individual does so without coercion – so as not to violate the jihadist interpretation of Qur’an verse 5:34:

“unless they repent before you overpower them – in that case bear in mind that God is forgiving and merciful.”


A speech by IS spokesman Abu Muhammad al-‘Adnani and the direct application in the video

The first Salil al-sawarim video ends with a slogan that has since become commonplace in IS propaganda: “the Islamic State will remain” (baqiyya). The conclusion of SAS1 also makes clear the ambition of the “Islamic State in Iraq” to expand into Sham (Syria) and liberate Sunni Muslims from the regime of al-Asad.

Online Jihad: Data Science

November 10, 2017

Online Jihad has been monitoring online communities since the 2007 release of Asrar al-Mujahidin, intended to facilitate secure communication with Islamic State Iraq amongst other jihadist groups. Over the intervening period the volume of content and platforms used to disseminate content has expanded rapidly. Marking this, Online Jihad will have a new series of posts focusing on Data Science approaches to tracking the Jihadist movement.


The ability of al-Qa’ida (AQ), and subsequently ISIS, to propagate their theology and demonstrate their particular methodology via modern communication technology has proven to be one of the most resilient elements and greatest area of innovation. Supporters even share (and mock) content intended to be part of the ‘counternarrative’ effort. For example, the tweet (below) from @DOTArabic was shared by a range of Jihadist Telegram channels.  The tweet shares the link to an article about  ‘Terrorist rehab‘ (  المركز السوريّ لمحاربة الفكر المتطرّف ) opening in Northern Aleppo.


The sharing of this type of content demonstrates an awareness of the influence operations against ISIS, which is also demonstrated by the Ansar al-Khilafah Publication – The Media War Upon The Islamic State: The Media Techniques of Misleading the Masses that lists different techniques which have been observed being used against ISIS. The techniques are grouped into Media Deviation, Propaganda and Psychological Warfare. These are the ‘three foundations’ through which “to make people stand with them or to turn away from al-Mujahedeen”.

The study of western tactics is particularly clear in two of the techniques identified in the Media War document.

‘Doubt Upon The Strength Of al-Mujahedeen’

The Media War Upon The Islamic State claims:

They will use words such as “so-called” or “alleged” or “apparently”. For example, they will say the “so-called fighters” or “so-called leader al-Adnani” and so forth, as if to give the impression that they do not really exist or that they are insignificant. They imply that there is something suspicious or false about the sources of al-Mujahedeen or any news of their successes or strengths.

‘Media Blackout’

Attempting to control the information available about the struggle with AQ and ISIS has been a common tactic across many theaters including the battle with the insurgency in Iraq and the current fighting against ISIS.

The Media War Upon The Islamic State claims:

“Sometimes [the Western coalition] do not want to admit casualties, and that is why you find many cases of several operations by al-Mujahedeen and news of this coming out of the battlefield or even their videos and evidence of it, yet you do not find any news about it in the mainstream media, as if it never happened.”

Reducing the level of AQ and ISIS content by removing content and suspending accounts has been a focal point of western policy, highlighted by many politicians and the heads of security services including GCHQ.

The Media War Upon The Islamic State, highlights “The mass twitter suspension is the perfect example” of the attempt to Blackout ISIS media. In addition, the ‘Global Coalition’ through official accounts such as the UK Against Daesh twitter account has taken a second angle, attempting to dissuade users and journalists from reporting or sharing Amaq content.


The AQ and ISIS strategists have long studied western tactics and understood how they would be leveraged against their movement. This contrasts with the confused interpretations for the Resilience and Appeal of “Islamic State” Electronic Propaganda often presented to western policymakers. Given the level of innovation, policy makers in the West are struggling to find a way to cope with the massive quantity and often times high quality productions issued by groups such IS who continue to draw in new recruits from western societies each month.

ansar 1000 tweets are 1000 arrows

Understanding how the internet is used to distribute content and build the networks of influence, which underpin the most resilient elements of the Jihadist movement, is vital. Unfortunately, while there has been no let-up in the quantity of analysis being published about ISIS media activities, there have been limitations in the quality of that analysis which has undermined the understanding of the Jihadist movement.


Online Jihad: Data Science

Lacking a nuanced understanding of the movement, both “counter-narratives” and takedowns have become trapped in a tactical paradigm. Once derided as a ‘straw man argument’, the need to understand how ISIS networks of influence operate at a strategic level is now evident to almost all; unfortunately in the meantime the tactical understanding of the movement has meant the U.S. and its Western allies have been drawn into open warfare online, on a battlefield chosen by their jihadist adversaries. As predicted in 2014, it is jihadist groups who have thrived in the chaos that resulted.

In 2017, highlighted in an earlier blog post:

… with the partial loss of territory and the de-population of Sunni urban centers in Syria and Iraq as a consequence, IS has withdrawn to the countryside, to continue the fight – and to maintain and upkeep their greatest weapon: media work as a means of long-term influence and resistance.

The study of the Jihadist movement has tried to understand it in terms of street criminals, gangsters, individuals obsessed with computer games (particularly first person shooters), and a desire to go from zero-to-hero. As shown in an earlier post;

these interpretations often lack any attempt to address the theological aspects of the movement … and prominence of scholars within the Jihadist movement’s overall interpretation of theological concepts, including an Islamic State model of governance.

Interpreting the work of the media mujahidin as marketing or in terms of their ‘brand’, fails to comprehend the role of their work within the movement – just as focusing on infographics and thinking in 140 characters leads to misunderstanding of the breadth and purpose of da’wah. Similarly using Hollywood as a frame of reference, rather than deep-rooted research on Islamic theology; and narrowly defined ‘official’ images rather than the true breadth of Arabic sources may sound good for 15 seconds, but it frequently underestimates the scale of content production and lacks the depth required to understand the purpose or strategy of the movement.

Focusing on social media, images, infographics and videos as ways of branding the jihadist movement, confuses the purpose of Jihad and da’wah;

“Jihad is Da’wah with a force, and is obligatory to perform with all available capabilities, until there remains only Muslims or people who submit to Islam.”[i]

Future posts in the Data Science stream on Online Jihad will focus on two themes,

  1. Applying Data Science methodology to monitor and understand Jihadist online communities,
  2. Highlighting where many of the current approaches to analysis of the jihadist movement lack nuance, use inappropriate methodology and at times fail to produce an authentic understanding of movement nor its strategy.


[i] Hashiyat ash-Shouruni and Ibn al-Qasim in Tahfa al-Mahtaj ‘ala al-Minhaj 9/213

Quoted by Abdullah Azzam, Defence of the Muslim Lands, (English translation work done jihadist media)

Part 2: “Upon the prophetic methodology” and the media universe

August 1, 2017


IS publishes a rich blend of propaganda on a daily basis, ranging from text documents to professionally produced videos. Any release by IS – as much as the intention of AQ media – seeks to inform, educate and convince the consumer that the jihadists are the only “true” Muslims, following the correct “prophetic methodology.” For jihadists, the heavy use of the media is part of their war for the “hearts and minds” – and the quest for authority, to be acknowledged as the only sincere representatives of ‘true’ Sunni Islam.

Among the major successes IS was able to reclaim for itself was the tearing down of the border between Syria and Iraq. While AQ has been theorizing about liberating and re-uniting Islamic territory for years without end, it was the “Islamic State” in 2014 that was physically able to implement what AQ claimed to fight for. The texts, published in classical print magazines of the 1980s and 1990s and later on the Internet have been enriched by Sunni extremist videos – with the same modus operandi (from off-line media to digital since the early 2000s). Anyone who knows the Sunni extremist literature, can read the videos in full, understanding all embedded codes, visual language, the habitus of the propagated Sunni Muslim identity etc.

evolution of jihadist magazines

IS turned the tables. By applying a great deal of Sunni extremist literature upon real territory, a population and having the space to document what was unprecedented (such as the execution of alleged homosexuals by plunging to death from roof tops), IS was able to establish a repository of videos in mainly Arabic but also other languages, where theology has been applied – and where the lesser initiated can become followers even without reading the massive amount of Sunni extremist materials available online. The videos bridge the language gap and serve as a pull factor into the mindset of Sunni extremism: those who do not speak Arabic and have questions about the Sunni Muslim identity offered by IS can find answers themselves by tuning into – for example – English language explanations of shirk (loosely translated as “polytheism” for now) by foreign fighters from Cambodia[1], or get a picture of the importance of the tearing down of the border between Syria and Iraq by a foreign fighter from Chile.


Without reading the Arabic core documents, however, theological nuances that echo into contemporary IS motifs and mindset is missing. This is where non-Arabic language translations and tabloid-styled magazines come into play and provide further explanations – yet serving as a further opening for the non-Arabic able consumers to dig deeper into the electronic treasure trove of Sunni extremist books and videos of the past 35+ years, including dedicated English, German, French, Russian, Bahasa etc. materials (including said books and videos). And these are the very documents that make up the Sunni extremist mindset and that lead IS to the application thereof where they can derive the theological framework for their non-combat actions or governing rules (from destroying museums to systematic destruction of Shiite mosques or enslaving Yazidis). Liberating territory defined as “Islamic” and enforcing shari’a rule carried out by the extremists, who would then establish special police units to assure any violation of religious commandments will be punished. This, naturally, targets the local population in an attempt to “reformat” or replace local Islamic customs and give religion the space it did not have before. Most of these theological concepts, parameters and nuances can be referred to the “prophetic methodology” – if we follow the extremists in their words. Thus the “caliphate upon the prophetic methodology” as a slogan represents in sum what jihadists and their sympathizers struggle for. This too, is not new if you recall AQAP slogans of the 2000s such as “akhriju l-mushrikin min jazirat al-‘Arab” and the deployment of the first bi-weekly electronic magazine “sawt al-jihad”.[2] These materials serve as a legacy for IS to establish itself in the 2000s and to unfold in 2013/4 onwards. In turn the legacy of IS and the massive quantity of contemporary materials will be the legacy for future Sunni extremist groups that are operationally sometimes but theologically always connected. With the demise of parts of IS-held territory, the coherent audio-visual narratives – nearly all of the over 2,000 videos are in full-HD, 16:9 – remain and serve as inspiration to restore rule by the “prophetic methodology” for future generations. This is where the nostalgia will kick in with all the jihadist legacy expressed by the texts, videos, nashid, poetry, even humor.[3]

IS was able to enforce theological authoritative texts and religious decrees using a solid basis by “AQ scholars” and consequently document the output by audio-visual means, which then on top had been consistently released on social media. At first massively on Twitter[4] before moving on to Telegram.[5] And of course there is the strategy to spray IS materials on all levels of the Internet. Telegram has replaced Twitter as the core and is the first line of dissemination from which onwards specific content gets pushed out. On Telegram not all content is being disseminated outside the core IS-groups into the ‘open net’, (might do an extra post on this sometime).

Hence, nothing of what IS does is new – however, the scale and pace of enforcing these theological parameters physically (and filming and disseminating this online) is new, with the exception of execution of alleged spies, hostages or “apostates” (as had been outlined by – of the many – Abu Yahya al-Libi, 2009). This is partly why the ‘narratives’ of IS are highly coherent and attractive. AQ often referred to ‘aqida (creed) and minhaj/manhaj (methodology) when outlining what defines a Sunni Muslim. This ranges from proper prayer conduct to destroying graves of holy men (awliya’) whenever possible. AQ was only able in a limited way to enforce this “prophetic methodology” when in control of pockets of territory in Iraq and especially in Yemen and partly in Mali and when AQAP 1.0 was active in Saudi Arabia targeting the “mushrikin”. The claim to re-enact the lives of early Muslims under the command of prophet Muhammad, acting on said “prophetic methodology” and applying divine laws as opposed to man-made laws is a core element of Sunni extremist theology and hence part of the wider mindset tied into the “Muslim identity” – by the standards of the extremists. Abu Mus’ab al-Suri (2004) romanticized about this as one of the objectives for any mujahid in his 1600 page long book “Global Islamic Resistance Call” (pages 42, 92). Al-Suri referenced a popular hadith, predicting “the return of the caliphate upon the prophetic methodology.” Ayman al-Zawahiri in his “fourth open interview” (2007), conducted online and published by al-Sahab – back in the day that communication took place within vBulletin community forums –, demanded that Sunni jihadist organizations in Iraq ally with “the Islamic State in Iraq” to liberate territory and consequently re-establish the “abode of Islam” (dar al-Islam) by introducing the “prophetic methodology”. End of July 2014, the al-Furqan Media Foundation (which was founded over a decade ago) released a video entitled ‘ala minhaj al-nubuwwa.


Claiming “prophetic conduct” means claiming infallibility. Dozens of IS videos in the past years show the enforcement of shari’a law regulations and applied theology – not only the hard power side such as the execution of spies, the amputation of hands, but also the collection of taxes, the enforcing of health regulations at food markets or state provided dental care. A great deal of this is carried out by the al-Hisba, the religious police, which not only enforces proper Islamic clothing but is also often seen in videos where contraband such as alcohol and tobacco are burned or items related to shirk) are destroyed.

From Theory to Practice & the On-/Off-Line Relationship

Religious references to the ahl al-Sunna wa-l jama’a are often made[6], meaning the Sunni Muslims who act according to the prophetic tradition (Sunna), emulating prophet Muhammad and his companions. Sunni extremists claim to be in the closest proximity to God by re-enacting the example and guidance, as set by the Sunna of prophet Muhammad and his companions (sahaba). IS has taken this concept to a new level by popularizing their slogan “upon the prophetic methodology” (ala minhaj al-nubuwwa). This means that they justify every action, ranging from the destruction of Shiite mosques to the execution of non-Sunni Muslims, with reference to certain, selectively chosen parts of divine scripture and the prophetic tradition.

Jihadist media operatives document all of these actions, who then produce professional, full high definition 16:9 videos. These videos are released on social media platforms that, in turn push contents onto the mobile devices and desktop computers of users.


The billboard above reads: “the messenger – peace be upon him said: “between a man and shirk and disbelief  stands the abolishing of [ritual] prayer.”

As IS applies a great deal of theological documents and theories penned by generations of AQ theologians, argumentatively, AQ remains most important and has regained an active role by offshoot groups and individuals who subscribe to this monopoly of truth. The theological parameters and interpretations of Islamic sources give out a highly coherent set of ‘narratives’. While the role model of the ‘proper’ Sunni Muslim according to these principals of faith (‘aqida) and religious methodology (manhaj/minhaj) is embodied by the jihadists who claim purity and absolute proximity to god. The doctrine of Sunni extremism provides a clear identity of what it should mean to be a ‘true’ monotheistic Muslim (muwahhid) and how to profess the divine laws of God (shari’a) as based on the authoritarian interpretations and guidelines freely available on the Internet – giving answers to real life grievances in zones of conflict across diverse Islamic countries. Fighters and clerics likewise and sometimes in rotating roles relate the written ideology into actions and fierce emotional sermons conveyed by the extremist’s most powerful platform: Telegram, Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and more; jihadi forums and dedicated websites. These role models, the corpus of texts, and most important the jihadi-affiliated and hijacked iconography most prominently represented and identifiable by the black banner with the imprinted shahada,[7] has successfully manifested within majority Sunni Islamic societies, and has even more so gained visibility within the Arab public space amid the chaos and aftermath of the so-called ‘Arab Spring’.[8] Perhaps even more so in times of upheaval and (re-) spawning of militant groups throughout the countries affected by the ‘Arab Spring’, first and foremost Syria, the emphasis of jihadist media advisors, strategists and contributors is set to emphasize their own role and importance:

“We are indeed convinced that the battlefields of the media jihad are of the most important streams of jihad and a elementary front thereof in this raging war with our enemies. Therefore, we [media workers] commit ourselves just as any jihadi brigade, working correspondingly with our brothers in the fields of war, directly encountering the enemies.”[9]

The media in principal is used on a tactical level, not only to incite and recruit individuals worldwide, but to create theological denominators and operational paradigms with policy guidelines for various jihadist groups. While “jihad” is first and foremost agreed to as being implemented by militant and violent means in general, or in short linked to “combat” (qital), the media thereof follows the rationale of propagating Islam (da’wa) and the proper religious methodology (manhaj/minhaj). This propagation thus is part of the overall objective to “establish the rightly guided caliphate” while uniting various Sunni fighting groups and individuals under this particular propagated manhaj.[10]

part 2 pic1

With the Islamic State having endured for years as the “established rightly guided caliphate”, stretching across Syria and Iraq as its core area, and the day-to-day application of the “prophetic methodology”, the legacy it already leaves behind for future jihad theaters is part of the many challenges to overcome modern-day global terrorism.

[1] Markaz al-Hayyat li’-l ‘ilam, Stories from the Land of the Living – the Story of Abu Khaled the Cambodian from Australia,

[2] Nico Prucha, Die Stimme des Dschihad “Sawt al-gihad”: al-Qa’idas erstes Online-Magazin Hamburg: Verlag Dr. Kovač, 2010

[3] See the statements by Thomas Hegghammer:

[4] Ali Fisher and Nico Prucha: The Call-Up: The Roots of a Resilient and Persistent Jihadist Presence on Twitter, Global Ecco, CTX vo.4 no.3, August 2014,

[5] Nico Prucha: IS and the Jihadist information Highway – Projecting Influence and Religious Identity via Telegram, Perspectives on Terrorism, vol. 10, no. 6 (2016),

[6] For example the major IS video release “The Clanging of the Swords, part 4”, published in May 2014. The video shows IS in the early stages of conquest and consolidating territory in the al-Anbar province of Iraq. Ali Fisher, Nico Prucha, Is this the most successful release of a jihadist video ever?, Jihadica, May 2014,

[7] The black flag comprises a centric grey circle imprinted with (from down upwards) “Muhammad – rasul – allah”, a reference to the Islamic creed “There is no God (allah) but God and Muhammad is the messenger (rasul) of God.” The symbolic is amplified as this exact layout and wording had been the seal of the prophet (khatim al-nabawiyya) whereas the contemporary jihadists further seek to position a monopoly of truth by signing documents and by placing the flag as an expression of divine will and power. The use of the Prophetic seal, placed not only on the flag but also to sign ‘official Islamic State’ documents and rulings, is served as a nonnegotiable authority, backed by the interpretation and application of Qur’an and Sunna – speaking in the name of God and His messenger, Muhammad, furthering the belief of being in a direct lineage to divinity and expressing the entitlement of the soldiers of God (jund allah).

[8] The manifestation of pro-AQ styled jihadist groups, exercising violence or ‘soft-power’ such as restoring basic infrastructure and handing out supplies to the Sunni population is evident by the trans-national appearance of the Ansar al-Shari’a network. The Ansar al-Shari’a groups propagate openly jihadist iconography and a similar rhetoric based on the fundamental teachings of AQ. The Libyan branch based in Bengazi and Derna as well as the chapter in Tunisia had been declared by the U.S. State Department as “foreign terrorist organizations” and “global terrorist entities” following the attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, September 11, 2012. Thomas Joscelyn, State Department designates 3 Ansar al Sharia organizations, leaders,, January 10, 2013.

[9] Mu’assasat al-Ma’sada al-I’lamiyya / Fursan al-Balagh al-I’lam (eds.), Bayan nusrat al-ansar li-ikhwanihim al-Mujahidin al-abrar,, October 10, 2013. This statement is signed by the most influential contemporary jihadi media key figures.

[10] Mu’assasat al-Ma’sada al-I’lamiyya / Fursan al-Balagh al-I’lam (eds.), Bayyan nusrat al-ansar li-ikhwanihim al-Mujahidin al-abrar, 3-5.



“Fursan al-Shahada, part 8” highlights Nigeria and Central Africa

November 19, 2010

Published some hours ago within the usual jihadist forums, the new ISI al-Furqan release does indeed focus on the conflict in Nigeria. But also the infamous minaret-ban in Switzerland is mentioned to portray how Islam and Muslims are being persecuted globally while being deliberately killed in certain zones of conflict (or in occupied territories such as Iraq and elsewhere where the Crusaders are active). Bosnia, Chechnya, Turkistan, the Philippines, Burma and Kashmir are also places where Muslims are under attack and mosques destroyed. With Nigeria being highlighted and introduced (basic geographical information, percentage of Muslims there, natural resources) a computer animated sequence introduces the video depicting a suicide-bomber driving a truck laden with explosives into a US-military base with a giant cross in the middle. Naturally, the cross is first knocked down by the truck before a gigantic animated explosion is set off showing then portrait pictures of the three self-inoculation operatives introduced in the video.

Attacks are being carried out in Iraq, the first attacker is from Saudi Arabia and his testimony “last words” are filmed with the operative behind the wheel of his bomb-rigged car. With the voice of Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi transitioning to Nigeria, once again showing the Aljazeera footage of the execution as well as a Christian preacher who lashes out against the Muslims (according to the Arabic translation). By all means Islam is under attack, the work of NGO’s are, of course, part of a greater plan to indoctrinate Muslim children and to further distort the true message of Islam.

Statements of the Mufti of Nigeria Ibrahim al-Husayni shown whereas the problem between Christians and Muslims are rather of tribal, economical and political nature. During his statement, which is also taken probably from Aljazeera, the video shows again and again the shooting sequences.

Scenes from AQIM’s video are introduced, showing the training of Mujahideen in some dessert while an AQIM member from Nigeria speaks out. The second self-inoculation operative in Iraq is then being portrayed, receiving his farewell hugs, working on IED’s and being accompanied by the voice of deceased AQI leader al-Muhajir and al-Baghdadi. His testimony was filmed in a living room like setting, striking out against the Christian-Crusaders, the Americans and the apostates. Children can be heard in the background. Followed by the testimony, the video shows Obama speaking at West Point and attacks the European Union, the partner of the US and the west as a whole with all its problems (economical (Lehmann Brothers), natural (BP Oil spill, Islands Vulcan)) and highlights Obama’s words who said that the US cannot deal with the problems by itself.

Subsequently the third operative is introduced (Saudi-Arabia) who seems to have himself blown up at a fortified road checkpoint.

The video ends with an address on how Muslims can help and what their obligations are.

New “Fursan al-Shahada” Video about Nigeria?

November 18, 2010

In October 2010 AQIM published a video, “The Raid of al-Damus“, regarding the situation of Muslims in Algeria but also in Libya and Nigeria. The video shows revenge operations against the Algerian police and National Army soldiers, ambushed on Algeria’s remote highways. These attacks not only took place to fight the infidel regimes in the region but particularly to avenge the execution of unarmed, detained civilians by the Nigerian army. AQIM takes this as proof to further justify its deeds and military operations with sequences of Abu Yahya al-Libi and Ayman al-Zawahiri in the video.

The scenes, it seems, have been taken from Aljazeera and put in motion in the AQIM video in its propagandized surrounding. Aljazeera describes the sequence as

“Al Jazeera has obtained exclusive footage from Nigeria which shows unarmed men being shot dead. The footage was taken last year when the Nigerian government was hailing its defeat of an Islamist rebel group known as Boko Haram.” The video shows the shooting of detainees in public by the Nigerian army (2:00) which has appeared in AQIM’s video.

“Muslims annihilated in Nigeria – The Crusader army kills Muslims in cold blood”. On the bottom right the al-Andalus media logo.


Corpses of Algerian soldiers are depicted in detail. Ambushed for their service for the Crusaders as well as their participation in upholding un-Islamic regimes as well as being responsible for killing Muslims.

What has this to do with ISI and the forthcoming video “Fursan al-shahada, 8” ? While part six was all committed to self-inoculation attacks in Iraq to “support Turkistan”, this 8th edition seems to be about killing and undertaking operations in Iraq for the sake of Nigeria. Alert forum members pointed out that the picture, as it appears with the remark “soon” shows pictures of the above mentioned massacres:

Forum member “BomBer” graphically points out that these two stills are from the massacre in Nigeria. Started by a user naming himself “Mullah Abu Omar” started the thread with “Walid al-Sharqawi” responding “the brothers in charge for the publication have previously focused on various circumstances of Muslims, such as in occupied Turkistan (west China) by the communists, after the massacre [further] violating the rights of Muslims there. And in this video the focus will feature the land of the Hausa, “Nigeria”, remembering the Muslims who are being tyrannized by many different means, inciting the Muslims in “Nigeria” to carry weapons. And God knows best.”

Hijacked Islam

November 18, 2010

The self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq, also known as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), announced today the 8th film of its notorious series of the “Fursan al-shahada“. These, mostly professionally made, movies show and depict the testimonies and attacks of those carrying out self-inoculation attacks, also termed ‘suicide’ or ‘martyrdom’ operations in Iraq. The greater meaning of the Arabic term istishhadiya is of essence, whereas the individual sacrifices his life for a greater good in order for ‘Islam’ to benefit while the Mujahid attains the status of having confessed the utmost possible for God with the claim of being rewarded accordingly in the afterlife.

The individuals read out their testimony, according to the usual habit of the jihad video genre, portray their – naturally – piety and the fear of God while moving out on “the path of God” to fulfil the divine command, a holy covenant of individual duty “to elevate the word of God”, living the lives of early Muslims solely in regard of combat and military actions – neglecting all other forms of spiritual and scholarly knowledge. This is highly effective propaganda combining the rhetoric and the wording of individual Mujahideen with the written ideology of AQ global. Here the consumers of online jihad materials find their role-models (prominently: Abu Dujana al-Khurasani) and are put in touch with elements who are in the battlefields and hotspots of jihad, who tell their tales, who have witnessed war and who express in their speech their drivers that led them to the decision of undertaking self-inoculation operations. In a previous part of “Fursan al-shahada“, the istishhadiyin operatives directed their attacks in the name of “helping Turkistan”, a region in western China where the al-Hizb al-Islami al-Turkistani went on a (Arabic) propaganda material publishing rampage after ethnic tensions rose. Since then, the “Voice of Islam”, an Arabic e-zine, is published on occasion. This edition of “Fursan al-shahada
is yet another statement by ISI to show their sympathizers that they are still in place, despite the ‘beheading’ of ISI leaders in April 2010. Further, these videos intend to deliver proof and role-models to the online crowds that the jihad for justice and truth (haqq) is not interrupted and that Iraq is as much as other theatres of jihad alive and striving for the jihadists’ understanding and definition of religion while – again – promoting martyrdom.

Anyway, with the Eid al-Adha on Tuesday, mabruk 1431!, it is certainly no coincidence, that AQ in general tries to further capitalize on public Islamic events and holidays. Usually within the forums ‘gifts’ are issued to the sympathizers and followers when Ramadan dawns. This year, Khalid al-Husaynan ‘blessed’ the online ummah with a series of speeches and sermons defining and interpreting Surahs, for example, or the “fear of hypocrisy” and the like. Punctually after the Islamic new year, AQI/ISI now announces “in order to celebrate Eid al-adha” a new movie part of the series depicting the testimony (al-wasiya) of self-inoculation operatives as well as their subsequent attacks. In some cases these operatives testimonies are filmed while sitting behind the wheel of the truck/car that will bomb them into heaven. This is attained as a deed of worship and falls into line of the jihadi school of thought as expressed by Abu Jihad al-Shami (“The Vision of the Jihaadi Movement & the Strategy for the Current Stage“):

“As it is well-known to any entry-level student of the Salafi Creed, worship is a general term that includes everything that Allaah, the Exalted, loves of actions and statements, whether apparent or concealed. Therefore, servitude is not limited to prayer, charity, fasting, and pilgrimage. Rather, included under the term ‘worship’ is Jihaad in the path of Allaah, love for the sake of Allaah and enmity for the sake of Allaah, calling to Allaah, removing oppression, judging by the Shari’ah, and ordering the good and forbidding the evil.” (p6)

In the past decade, AQ and co had been quite efficient and highly industrious within the online clouds to promote, expand and thus hijack specific religious, social and particularly historic settings, seeking to manifest proof of their actions as based on the alleged righteous, true and pious creed and subsequently being by their worldly actions closer to God than other individuals. The gaps have been filled and nowadays known faces such as al-Awlaqi shock the western media when all the sudden his sermons and speeches can be retrieved in English on YouTube, facebook, Twitter and other websites in various languages. This is certainly another dangerous and alerting fact but the missionary spreading of AQ’s definitions, wordings and notions have infected the internet for a very long time and new materials (videos and writings) appear almost daily, covering more and more niches and providing an in-depth appeal by letting the Mujahideen speak, who undertake such istishhadiya operations against foreign and/or domestic enemies, attaining both: fame online as well as the shahada (according the jihadist creed). An assessment of legitimizing the two severe istishhadiya operations in 2007 in Algiers can be obtained here.

By such “surprises” and “gifts”, the global torrents of jihad further attempt to hijack public parts of Islam, expressing a violent conduct as proper and rightful celebration of public holidays while adherents of this specific ideology speak out to provide personal justifications bound to an universal understanding of fighting Satan, the apostates, the disbelievers and what have you. Gifts and “glad tidings” are disseminated via the forums and instantaneously spread online.

“Soon, with the permission of God – 8”

Khalid al-Husaynan’s sermon on the 9th surah of the Quran – a gift during the holy month of Ramadan (published in August 2010).