Archive for the ‘ISIS’ category

How well established is the Jihadist movement on Telegram?

March 15, 2018

This post looks at a network of 462 human verified Jihadist channels on Telegram and over 6,000 additional Telegram channels and groups on which they draw. It demonstrates that the network is much bigger and exhibits a greater level of interconnection than indicated by recent references to munasir and supposed Core Nashir Channels Telegram. The post then highlights the ‘veil of silence’ that has been cast over the majority of activity conducted by the Jihadist movement on Telegram – activity which is primarily in Arabic, focuses on applied theology, and references a vast library of earlier writing, audio and video.

The use of Telegram by the Jihadist movement has attracted the attention of politicians, who have called on platform owners to deny the movement ‘safe spaces‘ – with inevitable push-back from others including Telegram CEO Pavel Durov. At the same time, rumors circulate of Silicon Valley VCs looking to invest in Telegram, while many column inches have been filled with the usual punditry and superficial commentary about ISIS and social media.

Nashir / News

The often referenced Nashir and other news related channels are a natural starting point for analysing Jihadist groups. Many of this type of channel allows users to see the other followers who are also members of that channel. Network Analysis shows the real number of users in the network (6,266 users) and the clusters of users (blue dots) who make similar combinations of choices about the channels to follow (orange dots).



Channels on the right of the network focus on the formally branded content distributed via Nashir and Amaq channels. Those channels on the left tend to blend the formally branded content with a greater level of supporter generated and affiliated media foundation content. Far from being less important, due to being ‘unofficial’ as is often presented, this blending of content reflects the shared purpose, rather than shared organisational structure, as had been outlined by Abu Mus’ab as-Suri over a decade ago.

BlackLight_picsThe BlackLight image feed (which updates with newly posted content from Jihadist Channels every 90 seconds) frequently shows a wide variety of content which ranges from branded content to pictures of former ideologues and leaders, to imagery which conveys concepts which will resonate with sympathizers versed in Jihadist theology, that of course is distributed primarily in Arabic.

Wider Telegram Network

This range of content is inline with what we expected to find. Nico Prucha has taken “a closer look at what Telegram is, and how IS uses it for different purposes: not only operationally, but also for identity building“. More than just narrowly defined ISIS branded content, the range of content “conveys a coherent jihadist worldview, based on theological texts written by AQ ideologues and affiliates as far back as the 1980s”.

To break away from the narrow discussion of ISIS content, we analysed the wide ecosystem of Jihadist channels. This ecosystem allows the Jihadist groups to maintain their resilience and distribute the full range of content out of view from those focused on Nashir / News content.


The graph is based on 290,000 posts and shows the content sharing behaviour of 462 human verified Jihadist Telegram channels, and over 6,000 channels from which they share content. Initial observations:

  • The graph shows that Jihadist Telegram Channels form a series of interconnected clusters.
  • Despite attracting the greatest attention from Western commentators, the Nashir News cluster is a tiny part of the overall ecosystem.
  • AQ and ISIS clusters are distantly connected.
  • There is a cluster of Jihadist sympathisers and supporters which align closely with neither ISIS nor AQ.
  • The creation of content archives on Telegram ensures users who see themselves as murabiteen (horse backed warriors) are able to access the content needed to conduct Ghazwa (raids) onto other platforms.

While the Nashir gain the attention of commentators and pundits, there is a large number of channels and huge amount of content going undetected. This content is also reaching large numbers of people, given that the content in the 293,000 posts has been viewed over 460 million times. (This is the number once the duplicate views have been removed). Below, for example, has been viewed over 309,000 times.

nashir stats sample

A subordinating silence

Caron E. Gentry and Katherine E. Brown have both shown how particular approaches, including cultural essentialism and neo-Orientalism, can cause a ‘subordinating silence’  which veils particular groups or perspectives from view.(1) These, like many of insights derived from the work on subordinating gendered narratives about terrorists who are female, provide valuable perspectives and parallels closely the issue of which parts of Jihadist ideational content matter to, or get attention from, Western researchers and policymakers.

As Caron E. Gentry has shown, the women who gain media attention are those “that present threats to the Western ‘us’ and not the Middle Eastern ‘other’.” Specifically highlighting coverage of women who either left the west to fight in Iraq, or with ties to AQ and as such threatened to attack Western interests elsewhere. By contrast, for ‘women who did not (yet) pose a threat to Western interests…, virtually no image exists in the public eye. They almost do not exist’.(2) Similarly one finds many studies of English language sources, with significantly fewer studies of the Arabic sources – despite Arabic being the primary and vastly more heavily used language of the Jihadist movement.

As the late Reuvan Paz noted, the movement is “almost entirely directed in Arabic and its content is intimately tied to the socio-political context of the Arab world”.(3) Yet the vast majority of research focuses on English sources. Perhaps this is the content Western researchers are able to find, or because so few researchers are able to listen to and understand the nuances of spoken Arabic nor read Arabic quickly enough to digest the volume of content which circulates in Arabic each week. It is hard to tell definitively which of these two interrelated problems cause the phenomena, but the result is a vast overexposure of sources in English compared to those texts meaningful to the core of the movement – written in Arabic.

naba 117 stats with banner.jpg

Above, the pdf version of issue 117 of al-Naba has been viewed over 7,000 times. Yet analysis of 12-16 pages of Arabic text by al-Naba’ warrants barely a mention, and is erroneously given the same weight as a single picture. Equally, text and images such as those below are often excluded from ‘analysis’ because they come from Amaq, despite being viewed over 9000 times on Telegram alone.

Both items are from the notorious Nashir channel, which is often cited and referred to in the context of IS’ media decline. One may wonder though, why the number of times for instance the al-Naba’ edition has been downloaded in the Telegram application never gets a mention. Perhaps letting slip that this newspaper usually gets around 7000 – 8000 downloads in just the Nashir channel, Amaq posts can get 10,000 views and some Nashir content has been viewed over 300,000 times, contradicts the drum beat that ISIS media is in decline?

Amaq view number sample

Here the study of rhetoric in gender subordination provides a valuable explanation of how such a process can cause a ‘veil of silence’ to descend over an entire area of study.

As Caron E. Gentry wrote:

Across time and place in global politics, rhetoric has often been used to perpetuate certain social ‘truths’ and norms. A speaker or author uses language to direct an audience toward a manufactured truth, one in which some information is emphasized while other information is concealed. In this way, the speaker designates certain ideas, norms, and events superior to others and ignores actions or events that might challenge them.(4)

With a particular focus on neo-Orientalist Narratives, Gentry highlights:

The othering so intrinsic to neo-Orientalism is deeply troubling because it blinds scholars, researchers, and law enforcers to any deeper realities or nuances in people’s lives.(5)

Whether caused by neo-Orientalist perspectives or other reasons, the veiling of particular aspects of the Jihadist movement through ‘terministic screens’ proposed by Kenneth Burke, means ‘the rhetor uses terminology that leads an audience to a specific figurative location (reflection) rather than to an unwanted place (deflection)’.(6)

Focusing only on a few munasir and supposed Core Nashir Channels is particularly dangerous as these are only the channels most readily findable by those in Western and predominantly English language dominated habitus. While much has been made of alleged access to a few secretive ISIS Telegram Channels, the data presented here highlights that approach risks becoming a terministic screen reflecting only a particular part of the Jihadist movement. See, for example, the announcement of a ‘total collapse’ of ISIS media. A month later, the initial fanfare had become ‘Total Collapse … Postponed‘ as the same commentators struggled to explain why ISIS media was on the rise again.

The narrow focus on ISIS branded content analysed from a Western habitus is, as Katherine E. Brown wrote in her discussion of  istishhadiyyat (female martyrdom operatives), further compounded by the security frame in which it is set:

in this mainstream view in which the principal frame of reference is the state, and in particular Western states, female suicide terrorism simply becomes a variant of an already known threat to the state. This security approach consequently leads to homogenization based on method of attack and its security impact rather than a recognition of the politics of those involved…. Research that adopts the security approach is thus blinded by the glare of the explosion: the corporality and immediacy of the violence and state responses are overexposed at the expense of other features of the phenomenon.(7)

There are striking parallels between the subordination of gendered narratives and subordination of Arabic sources, by the prioritization of sources accessible to a Western and English speaking audience. In the study of the current movement, scouring ISIS English language magazines for European locations, repeats the overexposure of Western State responses.

nashir execution stats 14032018

Prioritising the impact on Western countries means the underexposure of the Arabic theologically driven core of the movement. Likewise interpreting the theologically driven, primarily Arabic content using Western terms and solely English language publications risks creating a ‘subordinating silence’ around the intentions and strategy of the Jihadist movement. Particularly if commentators are still fast forwarding through videos showing violence and wondering to whom ISIS might be speaking.



  1. Brown, Katherine E. 2011. “Blinded by the Explosion? Security and Resistance in Muslim Women’s Suicide Terrorism,” in Laura Sjoberg and Caron E. Gentry, eds. Women, Gender, and Terrorism. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 194-226.
  2. Gentry, Caron E. 2011. “The Neo-Orientalist Narratives of Women’s Involvement in al-Qaeda.” In Laura Sjoberg and Caron Gentry, eds. Women, Gender, and Terrorism. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 176-193
  3. Paz, Reuven. “Reading Their Lips: The Credibility of Jihadi Web Sites as ‘Soft Power’ in the War of the Minds.” (2007)
  4. Gentry, Caron E. 2011. “The Neo-Orientalist Narratives of Women’s Involvement in al-Qaeda.” In Laura Sjoberg and Caron Gentry, eds. Women, Gender, and Terrorism. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 176-193
  5. ibid.
  6. ibid.
  7. Brown, Katherine E. 2011. “Blinded by the Explosion? Security and Resistance in Muslim Women’s Suicide Terrorism,” in Laura Sjoberg and Caron E. Gentry, eds. Women, Gender, and Terrorism. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 194-226


How 6th Graders would see through decliner logic and Coalition Information Operations

January 26, 2018

The nature of the mobile-enabled swarmcast means it may appear to be degraded, but it has really only reconfigured. 

This observation made in 2014 was based on earlier studies of Jabhat al-Nusra, ISIS and the online activity of the wider Jihadist movement – produced at a time when some commentators already claimed ISIS capacity on social media had been ‘degraded’.

The ‘bluckling’ of the ISIS media system, much talked up by decliners at the end of 2017, and presented as “not just a media decline—it is a full-fledged collapse” will, in 2018, turn out to be to have been a lull as the swarmcast reconfigured, rather than signs of collapse. 

This post shows:

  • How 6th grader math class could explain what is wrong with the current decliner logic and their approaches to quantifying output.
  • Why decliners ignore 2016 – and why 2016 destroys the claim of a pseudo-correlation between content production and area controlled.
  • What about 2014? – how 2014 further disrupts decliner logic.
  • A thought experiment – what would decliner logic predict about the direction in volume of social media Global Coalition?

War by the numbers

Wars often turn on numbers, data, and the real-life experiences of the individuals represented by those numbers. The habitus of those interpretting information about the war also influences how it is understood. This includes the lived experience of target audiences in the physical world and virtual domains. As Douglas Rushkoff predicted, the battle for reality continues online.[i]

In this vein the Global Coalition information operations have long sought to present ISIS or Islamic State as being in ‘decline’ or weak. This has included tweeting images which question the ability of ISIS to produce media content and presenting this as a measure of their decline.


While the tactic is not new – it is currently recognised by ISIS and earlier versions were discussed in depth by Anwar al-Awlaki – there is risk in confusing wishful thinking, the Information War, and academic study.

For example, ISIS has launched a new magazine al-Anfal, now on the 7th issue and the newspaper al-Naba is now on issue 116. It is noteworthy that al-Anfal is vastly better known by those in an Arabic habitus than by English and faux-Arabic language commentators – for whom it has barely warranted a mention.[ii]

6th grade math class – A holiday anecdote

The holiday season is often a time when people encounter others with different perspectives and experience. A maths teacher I spoke with highlighted why, the even in an information war, accurate data work is important to avoid becoming transparent propaganda.


In response to hearing that claims of decline are often calculated by counting the pieces of content irrespective of type, content, or length, the maths teacher originally responded; “that’s just stupid”. He was ready to dismiss the premise that anyone would count an hour-long video, a newspaper, a speech from the leader, an infographic and a picture as if they are all the same.

His reasoning was persuasive, he said;

If I set five assignments, then ask two students to hand in their homework

  • Student A hands in two of the assignments each on a separate sheet of paper
  • Student B has done all five assignments in his book & hands in the book

Student A has not done twice as much work as Student B because they handed in two sheets while Student B only handed in one book. The maths teacher concluded, I’ve taught a number of 6th graders that would have a problem with that logic.

Anecdote aside, there is a problem trying to build credibility with an audience using an approach which infantilises the intended audience with an argument which 6th graders can see through. This is the 6th grader problem.

Despite the clear limitations in the data, (for example, previous research has proven ISIS weekly production exceeded the CTC estimate of monthly production. (New Netwar p. 38) ) some have claimed that “the destabilization of the Islamic State’s territorial strongholds is correlated to a decrease in the volume of media production”.[iii] The problems with this way of thinking are numerous, of which the two most prominent are;

  • There is no calculation of correlation in the published research, so it is an assumed pseudo-correlation which is not based on any demonstrable relationship in the data.
  • The apparent relationship between territory and production can only be maintained by cherry picking certain points in time – entirely ignoring 2016. In fact, the entire decliner ‘narrative’ relies on ignoring the fluctuations in content during 2016.

Research has already shown why the summer of 2015 is convenient to cherry pick as a start point if your goal is to claim decline. As discussed in depth elsewhere, picking a time which logic dictates is most likely to be an outlier can make for a nice soundbite for coalition propaganda, and may even sound smart in 20 seconds of air time, but does not work for an authentic understanding of the movement.

The root of the problem, as Reuven Paz noted in 2007,

Jihadi militancy is … almost entirely directed in Arabic and its content is intimately tied to the socio-political context of the Arab world.[iv]

People who live in that socio-political context, or habitus, easily pick up on the factors likely to play into the spike in content over the summer 2015.[v] This is because;

the habitus is itself a generative dynamic structure that adapts and accommodates itself to another dynamic mesolevel structure composed primarily of other actors, situated practices and durable institutions (fields).[vi]

And because habitus allowed Bourdieu;

to analyze the social agent as a physical, embodied actor, subject to developmental, cognitive and emotive constraints and affected by the very real physical and institutional configurations of the field.[vii]

While it is tempting to focus on Western interpretations of Jihadist content, particularly if you can only draw on faux-Arabic, the habitus of the intended audience has to be foremost when analysing the meaning of the content.[viii]


Why decliners ignore 2016

Most of the recent claims of decline, including those by the Global Coalition, pick 2015 as the start point, then jump over the awkward hurdle of 2016 and head straight for 2017. This allows them to get past the fluctuations in 2016 and present “huge and steady decrease”.

To understand how this works, first it is important to understand the 2015 ‘highpoint’, from one of the often-referenced studies about 2015.

Journalists writing about the 2015 ‘highpoint’ have claimed ISIS “was producing more than 200 videos, radio programmes, magazines and photo reports each week” resulting in “just under a thousand unique data points, ranging from radio bulletins and electronic magazines to videos and photographic essays”[ix]

Perhaps not immediately clear to the reader;

  • “Just under 1000 unique data points” is in reality 892. This makes the ‘highpoint’ sound 10% higher than the reality. 892 could be described as just under 900 … but it is just under 1,000 like I’m just under 8 feet tall.
  • Composition of the content is around 80% pictures (just under 700 of 892 data points).

Problem 1:

Even for the astute reader it can be hard to tell what is being counted. As best as can be ascertained from the terms ‘events’, ‘photo reports’, ‘photographs’ and ‘photos’ being used interchangeably, this is unlikely to be 700 photo-essays (one every hour for a month) as the description of “200 videos, radio programmes, magazines and photo reports each week” would require.

Alternatively, if one differentiates a photo report from a photo by assuming a minimum of two pictures, and the graph showing approximately 700 ‘photos’ accurately reflects the data, then 700 / 2 = 350 reports. ISIS photo reports regularly have more than two images, but this is just a theoretical minimum.


If the non-photos account for the remaining 200 pieces (approx.) of content, which recent articles suggest, and this is added to the maximum number of photo reports it would be around 550 pieces.[x]

This is still a lot, but would still eliminate the claim of “200 videos, radio programmes, magazines and photo reports each week”.  Let alone the claim made in September 2017 of “hundreds and hundreds of unique media products, videos, magazines, radio bulletins, in lots of different languages coming out every single day.”

Problem 2:

As noted in a previous post, just counting a photo, speech, and video as the same makes little sense;

“It should be needless to write, this audio-release [of ISIS leader’s speech] by al-Furqan is of much greater importance than a single image, or photo report – at least for IS sympathizers and operatives. Although currently we still find ourselves having to write it”.

How the 2015 data is compared to 2017 production is illustrative of the way the decliner narrative is constructed. Recent journalism around ISIS decline, (which has since been publicised by UK government on Twitter) has used some creative ways to display longitudinal data, which fall well short of what would be required to pass 6th grade math class.

Edward Tufte, has “set out a detailed analysis of how to display data for precise, effective, quick analysis” in his Visual Display of Quantitative Information. This includes demonstrating that inappropriate use of data can lead to an apparent, but entirely spurious, connection between the fortunes of the New York Stock Exchange and the level of Solar Radiation.

Contrary to the ideas set out by Edward Tufte, the chart featured in a recent wired article gives the impression of a steep, linear decline by evenly spacing the bars, even though the chronological space between data points varies significantly. Two of the time points are only a single month apart while the other gaps are 6 and 17 months respectively.[xi]


When the image is quickly resketched, so all months are represented equally – both months with and without data – the problems become evident.

  • First, the impression of sharp decline is reduced.
  • Second, what happened to 2016?

Why does recent decliner narrative rely on ignoring 2016 and compressing these 17 months in the graph? Was there nothing to report in 2016?

Genuinely longitudinal data, rather than cherry-picked points, show there is much more to the story than drawing an imaginary line across that 17-month gap and claiming correlation.[xii]


Data from February 2016 to March 2017 shows production actually fluctuated, despite research claiming a “huge and steady decrease” or 30% to 40 % reduction.[xiii] At times in 2016 content was rising, at others falling. This nuance is entirely missing from decliner logic (whether from Coalition Information Operations or recent journalism).

Decliner logic insists on there being a single direction and that direction being decline – this despite decliner commentary also claiming to have identified recently a 25% increase in content – (barely 20 pieces per week in November and 25 pieces for week in December).

Using rolling mean to examine how production changed over 2016 uncovers some important results. For example, there was an increase of 132% in content production between low points in September / October 2016 and the decliner cherry-picked month of February 2017. This means, February 2017 occurred during a period of rising content production, rather than production heading in the single downward direction, as the Global Coalition imply and decliners explicity claim.

Equally, despite the counting of photos being used to show decline between 2015 and February 2017, video production increased. By adding all media types together, a decrease in easily produced photographs hides an increase in the higher resource requirement and greater impact of video production.

What about 2014?

Analysis which uses no-Arabic, faux-Arabic or google translate is no substitute for being able to read and listen fluently in Arabic. It is essential researchers are genuinely able to recognise the encoded references, historical precedents, and understand the habitus of the intended audience. 

Recent commentary has suggested:

“there can be no questioning the fact that the Islamic State’s media capabilities largely relied on its territorial clout between 2014 and 2017”.

However, a different picture emerges once the flaw in decliner logic and fluctuations in content have been exposed by genuine data science. This different picture is one which has long been evident to anyone embedded in an Arabic context and “crystal clear to virtually anyone who has the linguistic capacity to grasp and the opportunity to witness what jihadists are actually saying, writing and doing, both online and offline”.[xiv]

Unfortunately, it is a picture which is too often obscured from view by commentators writing from the perspective of a Western, English language dominated, habitus. These commentators often exhibit masculinist understandings of power, success, and victory and rely on faux-Arabic or google translate.[xv]

Just as genuinely longitudinal data disrupts the narrative of a consistent downward direction in content production, analysis of the territory held alongside the media production also shatters the illusion of a pseudo-correlation between the territory held and content production.

The Global Coalition has reported on the reduction in ISIS territory as a percentage area held at the territorial highpoint of August 2014. Yet, decliners claim summer 2015 as the media highpoint, which occurs while ISIS was losing ground, including parts of Sinjar and Kobane (14% in total during 2015).  Put simply, the count of content was increasing toward the claimed ‘highpoint’ while territory was decreasing.

Furthermore, the claims of a relationship between territory and media production after the 2015 media ‘highpoint’ are problematic because content production went up 132% between October 2016 and February 2017, yet territory held by ISIS went down. The Coalition territorial estimate for October 2016 shows that the territory ISIS had lost was 56% Iraq 27% Syria, by February 2017 this had become 63% and 35% respectively.

Contrary to what they expect, decliners asking ‘what about 2014?’ reminds us that the claimed media and territorial ‘highpoints’ occur a year apart and that the pseudo-correlation between the two evaporates when the change in production and territory are compared with genuinely longitudinal data rather than cherry-picking.

Conclusion: Appropriate use of Data Science emphatically destroys claims of pseudo-correlation between content production and area controlled. Saying ‘what about 2014’ just makes this clearer.

A supplemental thought experiment:

For the sake of a thought experiment, as the Global Coalition has been claiming success and territorial gains against ISIS – what would decliner logic predict about the volume of social media produced by the Global Coalition? So has the Coalition social media increased or decreased?

Using the last 3,000 tweets from each of the accounts run by the Global Coalition Against Daesh (Arabic, English and French respectively) all could be described as ‘in decline’ from an earlier highpoint. For Arabic and English, the ‘highpoint’ is in 2017, for French it is in 2016. If production is linked to battlefield success – Arabic and French speaking forces are in deep trouble – as production is down (over 90% for Arabic) from their social media height.



No doubt you are reaching for alternative explanations other than the collapse of coalition forces. If so you have understood the problem with decliner logic perfectly.

It is perhaps telling that the logic when applied to anything else is utterly transparent. The coalition propaganda even trips over its own logic, seeking to claim decline and how gaps in the production of magazines should be interpreted.


The above images show the Global Coalition has highlighted the time since the last issue of Rumiyya, but those with a longer memory will recall that before Rumiyya there was another now discontinued magazine, Dabiq. Both magazines are examples of communicating to the secondary – at best – target audience, namely English speakers. However, it is instructive as, in this case as Dabiq, there was a gap in production which began in September 2015 and lasted over 100 days (second longest gap between Dabiq issues). This, it should be noted, came the month after the claimed peak in ISIS content production, which decliners present as the zenith of the Caliphate.

If gaps in production of a prominent magazine (available in English) indicates weakness and territorial losses, as the Coalition implies, how was it Dabiq exhibited this ‘weakness’ during the period the Coalition refers to as the ‘high point’ of ISIS media production?

Indeed, as the Coalition and decliner journalists focus on a masculinist, post-Westphalian measure of victory, ISIS engage with their intended audience on a different plane. As narrated in a recent video اهل الثبات (The people who are steadfast) from ولاية كركوك (Kirkuk):

Morale is not something you can buy with money, and victory is not measured in square kilometres rather it is measured by the overall outcome, including the outcome in the hereafter, and not short-term achievements.

It is true that we lost ground, but with every day that passes the reality of the battle is becoming apparent to the Muslims worldwide, that this is a global campaign against Islam and the Muslims, it is a campaign against the Sharia and the very basic fundamentals of Islam.

Praise be to Allah that the mere existence of the Khilafah said what no long lectures and books could ever do to the hearts and minds of the Muslims worldwide.

I guess it is clear from the overall situation that we have already won the battle on the field of morale and ideas, winning it on the ground is just a matter of time, by the grace of Allah.

Victory is a complex concept in Jihadist interpretation of Islam.[xvi] Just as there is no meaningful relationship between Solar Radiation and NYSE, so Coalition propaganda, decliner logic, and the claimed pseudo-correlation between media and territory fail to provide an authentic representation of the current fortunes of the jihadist movement, their strategy nor their tactics.

As noted in 2014, the media mujahedeen are constantly reconfiguring and finding new outlets. In 2018, content production will continue to fluctuate.

The much talked up bluckling of the ISIS media system, presented as “not just a media decline—it is a full-fledged collapse” is likely in retrospect to have been a lull as the swarmcast reconfigured, rather than signs of  ongoing decline.  



[i] See for example;

Rushkoff, Douglas. Cyberia: Life in the trenches of hyperspace. Clinamen PressLtd, 2002.

[ii] It is also worthy of note, that in highlighting the gap in Rumiyah production (above) and the ‘high’ point in 2015 (below) the Global Coalition get themselves in a logical tangle. This is because the second longest gap in the production of Dabiq began in September 2015 the month after the claimed peak in content production. Was it strong – as the ‘high point’ would suggest – or weak as the long gap in publication of a magazine would imply in their logic about Rumiyah.

[iii] Mehdi Semati & Piotr M. Szpunar, ISIS beyond the spectacle: communication media, networked publics, terrorism, Critical Studies in Media Communication Vol. 35 , Iss. 1,2018

[iv] Paz, Reuven. “Reading Their Lips: The Credibility of Jihadi Web Sites as ‘Soft Power’ in the War of the Minds.” (2007).

[v] Lizardo, Omar. “The cognitive origins of Bourdieu’s habitus.” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 34.4 (2004): 375-401.

[vi] Lizardo, Omar. “The cognitive origins of Bourdieu’s habitus.” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 34.4 (2004): 375-401.

[vii] Lizardo, Omar. “The cognitive origins of Bourdieu’s habitus.” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 34.4 (2004): 375-401.

[viii] This is not to say the intended audience is sympathetic to the message, just that the message is intended for their consumption.

[ix] In the following section it is unclear whether the dubious data handling is due to the ignorance of the required skills / methods, or a sleight of hand in the presentation.

[x] The published research lists the titles of only 140 pieces of content

[xi] This trick is also used here:

[xii] There is a lot wrong with counting content – except where you are comparing total files detected for takedown vs. files released – this section shows what is wrong with decliner logic even in their own terms, rather than because the approach itself is insightful.

[xiii] This data comes from the torrent files released containing a collection of all the content for the ‘week’. These files were not released consistently in a seven-day cycle, but often varyied between a six and ten day cycle. As we have used the torrent file date to produce date of production, there are some periods of seven days without a total. This however, does not effect the total production and rolling mean is used to provide an authentic view of the ongoing levels of production.

[xiv] Rüdiger Lohlker, “Why Theology Matters – The Case of ISIS,” Strategic Review, July –September 2016; europe-s-misunderstanding-of-islam-and-isis

[xv] From an IR perspective see:

Sjoberg, Laura. Gendering global conflict: toward a feminist theory of war. Columbia University Press, 2013.

For a jihadist perspective see:

Anwar al-Awlaki, State of the Ummah.

[xvi] See for example; Constants of Jihad and the discussion of the contents of the book by Anwar al-Awlaki.

Salil al-Sawarim, parts 2 (2012) and 3 (2013) – making the Islamic state

January 14, 2018

Part of the Salil al-Sawarim mini series – a blast from the past of pre-IS/ISIS materials that are of grave importance to the IS ecosystem and the framework of Sunni extremism.


Any Sunni jihadist video incorporates elements and theological ‘narratives’ (question of habitus) that are visualized and implemented for their target audience – that target audience is Arabic native speakers who ideally understand substrates of Sunni extremism having been brought up within a Sunni Arab habitus. Sunni extremism has a text rich history and tradition as outlined before that predates IS and goes back to the first organized manifestation of Sunni extremism in Afghanistan in the early 1980s. Already in the 1980s, when hand drawn maps and black and white photographs enhanced Arabic type written magazines, within the jihadist mindset Afghanistan was carved out of wilayat – that then became known to a broader audience due to IS media work and non-Arab foreign fighters addressing their target audiences in their native languages. Yet, with the majority of Sunni extremist materials being broadcast to an Arab target audience above all others – as the Sunni extremist movement is dominated by Arab members – the overwhelming majority of (online) releases by Sunni extremists in general are in Arabic and all non-Arabic media items have references to originally Arabic language writings.


Salil al-Sawarim 2 (SAS2) shows fighters conducting hit-and-run missions, infiltrating Iraqi cities, such as Hit, Ramadi, or Haditha to capture and execute Iraqi counter-terrorist or government officials, and then withdrawing to the remote desert.

This modus operandi was a common theme for AQ in Iraq that morphed into the Islamic State today – with al-Furqan over the past decade and a half regularly releasing videos of hit-and-run missions, IED strikes on US vehicles, sniper attacks and hostages. While the 2012 and 2013 parts of Salil al-Sawarim videos highlighted pre-ISIS capability to undertake hit-and-run strikes disguised as Iraqi SWAT and police units, the 2014 release of the fourth part sought to document.

It is important to understand the full framework of Sunni extremism to comprehend the dynamics at work in the Arab world in particular as of 2018.Major video releases such as the four Salil al-Sawarim are the core of the post-2014 video productions of IS – showing the implementation of the “prophetic methodology”, the systematic execution of Shiites in Iraq (and later Yezides and bringing that mindset to Syria to combat the Alawite dominated Syrian army), the use of stolen Iraqi government police uniforms to infiltrate and kill as many as possible, the systematic intel-styled rooting ouf of high value targets; the coerced repentance of Sunnis in IS “liberated” areas, who have/had not other choice but to join or submit to ISIS – and who are now faced as of 2018 with a new wave of deadly sectarianism by the new forceful rule of Shiite militias driving their own agenda; the visualized concept of theological and historical coherent elements such as inghimas and shuhada’; the personal messages of (foreign) fighters addressing their Arab target audience in modern colloqiual Arabic to project Islamic knowledge in a preacher styled religious-authoritative setting and by thus are far more powerful and convincing than al-Zawahiri reading a script of the screen; all of these examplorary elements are tied to hundreds and hundreds of pages of Arabic text – historical as well as contemporary crafted by Sunni extremist key writers – and resonate within the Arab target audience and allow new members to initiate into this movement.

The second video also introduces footage that would become commonplace in “Islamic State” propaganda: a professionally-laid out shooting range where many masked men are training. The weapons shown include the classic Kalashnikov assault rifle, as well as the much glorified – and often seen in jihadist videos – Pulemyot Kalashnikova (P.K.) heavy machine gun. SAS2 is more sophisticated than its prequel; the attacks by the Mujahidin appear more precise, professional and deadly. SAS2 emphasizes the importance of media work, featuring an IS media operative preparing crates of DVDs to give out to Sunnis in the towns and cities that will be attacked but not immediately occupied.

A Mujahid is interviewed and introduced as a “soldier of the Islamic State”. Iraqi cars, gear and elite police SWAT equipment are handed out to the graduates of the training course.


A Mujahid in full SWAT gear gives an interview; apparently looted SWAT boots and uniforms being handed out

The video also features action footage in various towns and cities at night. Iraqi soldiers and policemen approach IS fighters disguised in special police uniforms to greet them, believing they are comrades, only to be executed.

Those who IS considers high-value targets, predominantly collaborators and Sahwa officers, are at the centre of the film. The film showcases IS laying the groundwork to eventually take over the territory cleansed of functionaries loyal to the central Iraqi government.

A blog named “Islamic News Agency – da’wa al-haqq” described the second SAS movie as a documentary in Full HD, with 49 minutes of IS fighters in special counter-terrorism vehicles conducting assaults in various cities and killing dozens of Iraqi soldiers.


The third video of the Salil al-sawarim series was released on January 17, 2013. By this time, the “Islamic State” was seeking to consolidate control of territory in Iraq and the purpose of SAS3 was to document its proclaimed campaign Hadim al-aswar (“take down the walls!”).

The video opens with a band of Mujahidin singing and the film is introduced as:

“a new phase in the conduct of jihadi operations, starting in the beginning of Ramadan, a.H. 1433. The Mujahidin have arisen anew and returned to areas from which they had previously withdrawn. This film is a documentary of some of the military operations in this important and historical phase for jihadist work in Iraq.”

The campaign “take down the walls” consisted of systematic attacks on prisons and had two strategic objectives:

  1. Exacting revenge for Sunnis, perceived as excluded, marginalized and persecuted by the ruling Shiite majority of Iraq;
  2. Replenishing fighter ranks with freed inmates who have little choice but to support and join IS.

The official banner of the al-Furqan release in the light of the campaign “take down the walls!”

SAS3 features freed inmates of the Tasfirat prison in Tikrit who have assumed or resumed leadership roles within IS. These men inform the audience of the hardship and torture endured in prison while relaying theological interpretations framed within the need to act.

The Sunni community is repeatedly portrayed as driven to extinction by Iranian-backed Shiites and Western enmity. In addition, every IS armed operation is framed as an altruistic act for the Sunnis in Iraq and Syria.

The specific Sunni extremist interpretation of the Qur’an and the Hadith are put in practice; for example, a Mujahid issues a call to prayer while standing next to slain enemies. Such footage is intended to portray IS as the only Sunni group willing to resist the Shiite takeover of Iraq and Syria.

The 80-minute long SAS3 concludes with a massive suicide bombing attack on an Iraqi army barracks near or in Mosul, undertaken by a Tunisian foreign fighter. He is identified as Abu Ziyyad al-Bahhar “from Tunis, the Muslim city where real men are made.” He describes his emigration (hijra) into Syria and then Iraq in 2013 and claims he did not face any problems while traveling. Using classical Sunni extremist rhetoric, he urges others to follow his example:

“This is not the end of the path – no (…) Many of our brothers have spent many years in prison (…). Hijra, jihad, hardships and combat; being imprisoned, blood, flesh [and sacrifice], this is the path. This is the path of Muhammad.”

The “Islamic State” is the first Islamist movement to make highly professional use of the Internet for “missionary purposes” (da’wa) related to territory seized from sovereign states and having had the ability to control these for a longer time. The control of strategic towns and even huge cities such as Mosul, parts of Ramadi (2014-2015), Fallujah, and Raqqa, the capital of the “Caliphate”, allowed IS media workers to continuously produce new video propaganda from both the ‘hinterland’ as well as the frontlines.

This enabled jihadist media strategists to convey several messages; firstly, they showcase IS members building and maintaining critical infrastructure for civilians, while fighting, bleeding and dying for their altruistic project on the frontlines. They also show IS fighting a rich blend of enemies, including air force raids by the “crusader alliance” and various Shiite, Kurdish and Christian militias on the ground. These sequences are intended to convey a sizeable Islamic state populated by people who have adopted a real Muslim identity.

This is a legacy new and less initiated members can quickly come to terms with: what are we fighting for (as was outlined by al-‘Utaybi in 2006 or Abu Hamza al-Baghdadi in 2005).

The dangerous difference is that a secret and hidden mindset comprising of over thousands of pages written in Arabic by AQ and later enriched by IS “scholars” is available – mostly unchallenged – online that showcases and demonstrates in often times humble and honest words by men who have bled and died for their beliefs, why any “true” Sunni Muslim should follow their path and reclaim violently territory lost by IS and/or attack clearly theologically defined enemies as legitimate to attack worldwide.

IS ecosystem: Salil al-Sawarim (2012)

January 1, 2018

Part of the Salil al-Sawarim series

The first part of Salil al-sawarim (SAS1) was released by “Islamic State in Iraq” (ISI) in 2012. After al-Qaeda in Iraq consolidated control over the Sunni province of al-Anbar, it declared the establishment of ISI, al-dawlat al-Iraq al-Islamiyya – in October 2006. Al-Anbar province has an extensive border with Syria that includes the Syrian town of Minbaj, which became one of the main hubs for cross-border activity and which was later conquered by IS and lost in late 2016.

SAS1 features a rich blend of “narratives” that have formed an integral part of Sunni extremist identity since the U.S. occupation of Iraq in 2003/4. SAS1 features several prominent jihadist figures, including IS godfather Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi and IS spokesman Abu Muhammad al-‘Adnani. The video portrays the Shiites as mere agents and henchmen of the Americans and shows a number of attacks on police posts and individuals accused of apostasy and collaboration – a signpost of what would increase in scale and pace leading to 2014, the declaration of the caliphate – as well as to mid-2017 with the increasing loss of territory and the return to the old tactics.


Salil al-Sawarim 1 fostering sectarian tensions and praising the “Islamic State” Godfather Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi

The first film features two sequences that would later become “Islamic State” modus operandi, and appear prominently in SAS4. The first type of sequence depicts well-planned, well-organized and well-executed rapid attacks on police and army checkpoints in urban and remote areas of the country. For example, the film shows fighters killing uniformed officers in Baghdad in hit-and-run and execution-style shootings. The film uses audio recordings of Abu Muhammad al-‘Adnani or Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi to justify these killings – a common example of how speeches of even long deceased figures of influence matter to the movement to date. The second type of sequence shows fighters raiding army outposts in remote areas. The aftermath of these attacks is also shown, including close-ups of dead Iraqi soldiers as proof of the success of the Sunni extremists – something that has in the second half of 2017 intensified again with the loss of territory and the systematic attacks on remote and undermanned outposts in the Iraqi desert.

In other parts of SAS1, suicide bombers give their testimony (wasiyya) while crude bombs and handgun silencers are proudly shown as “industrial produce of the State for the oppressed,” whom IS claims to be fighting for. Sniper scenes are an integral part of the first SAS movie, as in SAS4.

The post 2014 IS weapons workshops as a game changer on the battlefields is outlined in this article here.

SAS1 features a coherent blend of elements of Iraqi-based Sunni extremist theology, notably the theoretical offer to fellow Sunni Muslims, including those in the ranks and service of the Iraqi army, police and government, to repent (tawba) and become “true” Muslims again. This form of repentance and inclusion is important throughout the series, but reaches a climax in the fourth SAS video, which shows the mass repentance of Sunnis in areas that IS conquered in Iraq in early 2014.

This is a form of applied theology, an idea that originated with AQ, though it lacked the territory to fulfil its implementation. By contrast, SAS1 features former Sahwa (“Awakening Council”) soldiers repenting and joining IS while its spokesman, Abu Muhammad al-‘Adnani, calls on all Sunnis to renounce their loyalty to the Iraqi Shiite-led government of al-Maliki.

A targeted assassination in SAS1 set the precursor for what was about to hit Iraq, in particular the region of al-Anbar and the cities of Fallujah, Ramadi, Mosul and smaller towns such as Hit. And it is this exact modus operandi that IS has, as of 2018, reverted to with the strategy of denying their enemies a long-term prospect of controlling the terrority that was lost by IS according the the themes of the video and written propaganda released since August 2016.

SAS1 also features a speech by Abu Muhammad al-‘Adnani entitled “we renew our invitation (da’wa) to every apostate, traitor and deviant to repent and to return [to the state of being a Sunni Muslim.” This offer is especially directed at “policemen and Sahwa members” and ceases to be valid when IS overpowers or captures them. According to jihadist reasoning, repentance can only be considered sincere and potentially accepted if the individual does so without coercion – so as not to violate the jihadist interpretation of Qur’an verse 5:34:

“unless they repent before you overpower them – in that case bear in mind that God is forgiving and merciful.”


A speech by IS spokesman Abu Muhammad al-‘Adnani and the direct application in the video

The first Salil al-sawarim video ends with a slogan that has since become commonplace in IS propaganda: “the Islamic State will remain” (baqiyya). The conclusion of SAS1 also makes clear the ambition of the “Islamic State in Iraq” to expand into Sham (Syria) and liberate Sunni Muslims from the regime of al-Asad.

Notes on the “Salil al-sawarim” series: the theological framework – from Amsterdam to the “Islamic State”

November 16, 2017

SAS4 cover

The release of the video Salil al-sawarim (SaS) by ISIS’s media department al-Furqan in May 2014 demonstrated the sophistication of the jihadist use of social media to disseminate their video content. At the time, this had been Twitter – needless to write, Telegram as of early 2016 – and now in full swing as of end of 2017 – has replaced Twitter as the first entry point for new IS curated content. The Twitter metrics are detailed at Jihadica (two part series). Notions and sentiments visualized by videos such as Salil al-Sawarim over the past years have enabled to jihadists to project influence on a number of layers and levels, demonstrating how – in their mindset – Islamic territory has to be “restored” and “cleansed”. The first three Salil al-sawarim videos had been very popular, high quality edited and showed a mix of extreme obscene violence and ideology at play by IS’ predecessor “the Islamic State of Iraq”.

This post provides a few elements of  Salil al-sawarim 4, or the “clanging of the swords, 4”  as it provides an excellent example of a certain form of IS propaganda. More specifically, it is a key example of how IS uses theology to justify the actions of its fighters and legitimise its occupation of territory in Syria and Iraq – and the legacy it leaves behind as of end of 2017 with the loss of most of the territory the jihadists had managed to control, according to al-Quds al-Arabi.

The series Salil al-Sawarim is particularly illustrative of this emphasis on theology. Readers sufficiently initiated into the mainly Arabic language corpus of Sunni extremist theology will understand the title’s particular reference right away;[1] it refers to the book al-Sarim al-maslul ‘ala shatim al-rasul, “the Sharp Sword on whoever Insults the Prophet.” Its author is 13th century Islamic scholar Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328 AD), who is often referred to as shaykh al-Islam (“the scholar of Islam) in the conservative / orthodox Arabic-Islamic framework.

Ibn Taymiyya is renowned for his “characteristically juridical thinking”[2] and viewed as a highly competent legal scholar. His writings are based – at least in part – on Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh).

IT asSarim almaslul

Ibn Taymiyya has featured prominently in Sunni extremist thought since the 1980s, when AQ established this ideology. The “Islamic State” has based all of its audio-visual output on the theology penned by AQ. The crucial difference is that IS has the territory to implement and enforce this corpus of theology on the population of the self-designated “caliphate”.

Ibn Taymiyya provides a legal framework based on jurisprudential findings for killing “an insulter of the prophet, regardless whether he is a Muslim or a disbeliever”.[3] Whoever insults the Prophet, according to Ibn Taymiyya, “must be killed, no matter if he is a Muslim or disbeliever, and has no right to repent.”

Within the Sunni extremist mind-set, the sword must be drawn upon anyone who opposes their worldview and specific interpretation of Qur’anic sources or the hadith (sayings and deeds of Prophet Muhammad). In various AQ and IS videos, a specific sound effect subtly underscores references to Ibn Taymiyya’s writings. This sound effect, popular within jihadist online subculture, is that of a sword drawn from its shaft, clanging in the process.

Jihadists have also used the writings of Ibn Taymiyya to justify specific attacks. For example, Muhammed Bouyeri cited Ibn Taymiyya’s book before killing Dutch filmmaker and Islam critic Theo van Gogh in November 2004 in Amsterdam:

“Shortly before he [Bouyeri] killed van Gogh, he circulated the theological tractate on the “heroic deed” of Ibn Maslama[4] per e-mail to his friends. It is one of the 56 texts Bouyeri wrote or distributed. The fatwa of Ibn Taymiyya was among them also in a short leaflet-form downloadable from titled “The drawn sword against the insulter of the Prophet” (al-sarim al-maslul didda shatim al-rasul). It is likely that the text not only influenced Bouyeri’s decision to assassinate van Gogh, but also his method.

The text details how and why to kill targets, first of all because of insult (shatm, sabb, adhan) of Islam. Bouyeri tried to sever van Gogh’s head with a big knife after he had shot him several times. In the text we find the passage: “the cutting of the head without mercy is legal if the Prophet does not disapprove it.” Moreover, the text advises multiple times to use assassination as an act of deterrence. The slaughter of van Gogh in open daylight seems like a one-to-one translation into reality of the directives we find in the text.”[5]vanGogh_Buyairi

User-created content on Twitter praising the killing of Theo van Gogh, outlining the theological obligation to hunt anyone who insults Prophet Muhammad or God.[6]

In addition, AQ alluded to the writings of Ibn Taymiyya in a video claiming responsibility for a suicide bombing targeting the Embassy of Denmark in Pakistan in 2008[7] after a Danish newspaper published cartoon depictions of Muhammad.

Ibn Taymiyya is among several traditionalists and historical scholars who have explored the subject of avenging the Prophet Muhammad. The work by Jordanian-Palestinian jihadist scholar Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi stands out in its attempt to clearly outline who can be killed legitimately for insulting Prophet Muhammad. Al-Maqdisi extends this beyond individuals, and says any government deemed to have insulted either the Prophet, God or religion in general is a legitimate target for reprisal.[8]

In January 2015 two brothers, apparently trained in Yemen by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, opened fire in the offices of the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo. After the attack, a bystander filmed the Kouachi brothers shouting, “We have avenged the Prophet” (li-intiqamna al-rasul), before fatally shooting wounded French police officer Ahmad Merabet.[9] A video published on January 11, 2015 by the IS-affiliated media outlet, Asawitimedia, praised the attacks. The video is entitled “The French have insulted the Prophet of God – thus a merciless reaction.”


“The French have insulted the Prophet of God”

There is a coherent message across jihadist writings, videos, and theological decrees that say vengeance restores the dignity of Prophet Muhammad. They command individuals worldwide to demonstrate their faith by responding violently to those who insult the Prophet.

IS’ fourth Salil al-Sawarim movie, in which retribution for insulting Prophet Muhammad is the underlying principle of a brutal and rapidly emerging sectarian war (harb ta’ifi), shows IS fighters seeking to exterminate the Shiites, portrayed as a group that has insulted the prophet, his companions, God, and in sum, Islam, since the early days of the religion. This is one of the key theological principles of “the Islamic State of Iraq” that then became even more important in the phase of conquest and expansion into Syria 2012 onwards. The countless videos by the then re-named “Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham” ensured to reformat its newley conquered territory – on the one hand, killing or forcing locals to join – or public “recant” and return to IS understanding of ahl al-Sunna wa-l jama’a – and on the other hand the systematic eradication of Sufi shrines, graveyards, sacred trees, Shiite mosques, Yazidi temples, Christian churches etc. as based on AQ’s penned and yet fiercly deployed theology by IS’ Godfather Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi – and embodied by the IS and the khilafa as tradition henceforth.


Such nuances are at the very core of all Sunni extremist Arabic language releases – not since IS, but since the very 1980s. What we have witnessed is a subsequent expansion of theological steered acts across regions and countries where Sunni extremists in recent years have had the chance to set up a foothold – no matter how temporary that has been.

in the above sequences of screenshots  Ibn al-Qayyim, the disciple of Ibn Taymiyya, referred to as shaykh al-Islam by orthodox Muslims is cited in regards of the destruction of the “site of veneration by the rafidimushrikin”. The text serves as the jurisprudence for IS to act:

  • “it is not permissible [for Sunni Muslims] to leave the sites and places of shirk and idols untouched once the power to destroy them is established, even if just for one day. For these are the symbols of kufr and shirk are the from the greatest of evil. Therefore, it is not permissible to rule maintaining after conquering these sites.”
  • In Arabic: tawaghit, plural of taghut, a term used in reference of worldly tyrant rulers and idols, worshipped in violation of tawhid. The fight against taghut in jihadist mindset is bound by both elements – fighting worldly un-Islamic Arab regimes and thus restore the ‘true’ Islamic community (umma).

For example, SAS4 shows several sequences in which murdered Iraqi soldiers are described as Shiites, or rejectionists (rafida), a degrading term in Sunni extremist literature. The film marks Shiites as inferior humans who constitute the “interior enemy” because they are Arabs – in Iraq at the time as opposed to the Iranian intervention later. It follows that they are Islam’s most important foe and must be fought first and foremost.

Text and videos are not the only means of spreading the theoretical principle of avenging the Prophet; two of the most popular jihadist songs, or nashid, on YouTube reference Ibn Taymiyya and the notion of killing all those who insult Islam. A nashid by Abu Yaseer has had over 1.5 million views and can easily be retrieved online by searching for “Salil al-Sawarim”.[10] A related nashid with the title “the words [are now about action and hence] words of the sword” by Abu ‘Ali has over 3.5 million views.[11] The reference of the “sword” unites both nashid.

The four-part Salil al-sawarim series conveys three main themes:

  1. Punishment: It is legitimate to kill anyone considered a non-Sunni Muslim, in particular the Shiites of Iraq. Shiism
  2. by Sunni extremist standards is portrayed as a sect that has deviated from Islam and seeks to destroy Sunni Islam from within.
  3. Inclusion and representation: IS is shown operating carefully within Sunni territories in Iraq and Syria, assassinating key government figures and offering the Sunni majority a chance to reintegrate into the true Sunni community – represented solely by the “Islamic State” – by repenting (tawba) their sin of having worked for non-Sunni Muslims.

The chance to repent has become an integral part of IS strategy to consolidate newly-conquered territory. Key IS ideologues such as Abu Muhammad al-‘Adnani have supported this strategy; it consists of annihilating key figures of the Iraqi government; punishing Sunnis who collaborated with the Americans or Shiites; and offering Sunni police and soldiers a chance to be cleansed of their sins and restored as true members of the Sunni community by renouncing their past actions and swearing allegiance to al-Baghdadi.

Salil al-sawarim has turned into a popular and active meme online. It fosters IS identity and creates role models in a fandom-styled environment where users can create and upload their own images to praise videos like SAS and the worldview they depict.

IS has become more than an idea or a physical movement. It has managed to spread its “values” and theological reference points across a wide range of online platforms in a number of languages, primarily Arabic.

[1] Rüdiger Lohlker, Why Theology Matters – the Case of Jihadi Islam, Strategic Review (July-September 2016),

[2] Wael b. Hallaq: Ibn Taymiyya against the Greek Logicians. Translated with an introduction by Wael Hallaq, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, xxxiii.

[3] The book is available online on various websites and outlets, for example Dorar al-Sunniyya, A print version is available in most religious book shops in Arab countries. The image is a book cover illustration of a commented version published as: Ibn Taymiyya, al-Sarim al-maslul ‘ala shatim al-rasul li-shaykh al-Islam Taqiyy al-Din Ahmad bin ‘Abd alHalim Ibn Taymiyya al-Harrani, Shibra al-Khayma: Alexandria and Medina, 2008.

[4] As the author of the citation Philipp Holtmann explains, “terrorists are called upon to identify with the Muslim Ibn Maslama who volunteered to kill Muhammad’s critic Ka’b bin al-Ashraf.” Philipp Holtmann, Virutal Leadership in Radical Islamist Movements: Mechanisms, Justifications and Discussion. Working Paper, The Institute for Policy and Strategy, Herzliya Conference February 6-9, 2011,

[5] Ibid.

[6] The text praises Muhammad Bouyeri as a jihadist role model. Not only has he acted to avenge the violation of van Gogh against religion in general, but rather he, according to the text, denounced the worldly law in the Dutch court, claiming to only acknowledge shari’a law.

[7]A video entitled al-qawla qawla al-sawarim, “the words [are now about action and hence] words of the sword”, shows the testimony of the suicide operative identified as a Saudi by the nom de guerre Abu Gharib al-Makki [the Meccan]. The one-hour video justifies the attack; “the time to talk is over, the time for actions (i.e the swords must be drawn) has come to avenge the insults of Prophet Muhammad”.

[8] Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, al-Sarim al-maslul ‘ala sabb al-rabb aw al-din aw a-rasul sala l-llahu ‘alayhi wa-salam, Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l Jihad.

[9] A detailed oversight is provided by the BBC, also outlining in depth the attack by IS member Amedy Coulibaly who executed several hostages in a Jewish supermarket,

Amedy Coulibaly uploaded a video where he pledges allegiance to al-Baghdadi. Part of his video is used in one of the ‘official’ IS videos to applaud the January 2015 Paris attack, Risala ila Fransa, Wilayat Salah al-Din, February 14, 2015.

[10] Hosted by the YouTube Channel “The Great Breakfast War” – the channel & link have been deleted. Thank you YouTube!

[11] This singer was featured in Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula videos as far back as 2003/4.

Online Jihad: Data Science

November 10, 2017

Online Jihad has been monitoring online communities since the 2007 release of Asrar al-Mujahidin, intended to facilitate secure communication with Islamic State Iraq amongst other jihadist groups. Over the intervening period the volume of content and platforms used to disseminate content has expanded rapidly. Marking this, Online Jihad will have a new series of posts focusing on Data Science approaches to tracking the Jihadist movement.


The ability of al-Qa’ida (AQ), and subsequently ISIS, to propagate their theology and demonstrate their particular methodology via modern communication technology has proven to be one of the most resilient elements and greatest area of innovation. Supporters even share (and mock) content intended to be part of the ‘counternarrative’ effort. For example, the tweet (below) from @DOTArabic was shared by a range of Jihadist Telegram channels.  The tweet shares the link to an article about  ‘Terrorist rehab‘ (  المركز السوريّ لمحاربة الفكر المتطرّف ) opening in Northern Aleppo.


The sharing of this type of content demonstrates an awareness of the influence operations against ISIS, which is also demonstrated by the Ansar al-Khilafah Publication – The Media War Upon The Islamic State: The Media Techniques of Misleading the Masses that lists different techniques which have been observed being used against ISIS. The techniques are grouped into Media Deviation, Propaganda and Psychological Warfare. These are the ‘three foundations’ through which “to make people stand with them or to turn away from al-Mujahedeen”.

The study of western tactics is particularly clear in two of the techniques identified in the Media War document.

‘Doubt Upon The Strength Of al-Mujahedeen’

The Media War Upon The Islamic State claims:

They will use words such as “so-called” or “alleged” or “apparently”. For example, they will say the “so-called fighters” or “so-called leader al-Adnani” and so forth, as if to give the impression that they do not really exist or that they are insignificant. They imply that there is something suspicious or false about the sources of al-Mujahedeen or any news of their successes or strengths.

‘Media Blackout’

Attempting to control the information available about the struggle with AQ and ISIS has been a common tactic across many theaters including the battle with the insurgency in Iraq and the current fighting against ISIS.

The Media War Upon The Islamic State claims:

“Sometimes [the Western coalition] do not want to admit casualties, and that is why you find many cases of several operations by al-Mujahedeen and news of this coming out of the battlefield or even their videos and evidence of it, yet you do not find any news about it in the mainstream media, as if it never happened.”

Reducing the level of AQ and ISIS content by removing content and suspending accounts has been a focal point of western policy, highlighted by many politicians and the heads of security services including GCHQ.

The Media War Upon The Islamic State, highlights “The mass twitter suspension is the perfect example” of the attempt to Blackout ISIS media. In addition, the ‘Global Coalition’ through official accounts such as the UK Against Daesh twitter account has taken a second angle, attempting to dissuade users and journalists from reporting or sharing Amaq content.


The AQ and ISIS strategists have long studied western tactics and understood how they would be leveraged against their movement. This contrasts with the confused interpretations for the Resilience and Appeal of “Islamic State” Electronic Propaganda often presented to western policymakers. Given the level of innovation, policy makers in the West are struggling to find a way to cope with the massive quantity and often times high quality productions issued by groups such IS who continue to draw in new recruits from western societies each month.

ansar 1000 tweets are 1000 arrows

Understanding how the internet is used to distribute content and build the networks of influence, which underpin the most resilient elements of the Jihadist movement, is vital. Unfortunately, while there has been no let-up in the quantity of analysis being published about ISIS media activities, there have been limitations in the quality of that analysis which has undermined the understanding of the Jihadist movement.


Online Jihad: Data Science

Lacking a nuanced understanding of the movement, both “counter-narratives” and takedowns have become trapped in a tactical paradigm. Once derided as a ‘straw man argument’, the need to understand how ISIS networks of influence operate at a strategic level is now evident to almost all; unfortunately in the meantime the tactical understanding of the movement has meant the U.S. and its Western allies have been drawn into open warfare online, on a battlefield chosen by their jihadist adversaries. As predicted in 2014, it is jihadist groups who have thrived in the chaos that resulted.

In 2017, highlighted in an earlier blog post:

… with the partial loss of territory and the de-population of Sunni urban centers in Syria and Iraq as a consequence, IS has withdrawn to the countryside, to continue the fight – and to maintain and upkeep their greatest weapon: media work as a means of long-term influence and resistance.

The study of the Jihadist movement has tried to understand it in terms of street criminals, gangsters, individuals obsessed with computer games (particularly first person shooters), and a desire to go from zero-to-hero. As shown in an earlier post;

these interpretations often lack any attempt to address the theological aspects of the movement … and prominence of scholars within the Jihadist movement’s overall interpretation of theological concepts, including an Islamic State model of governance.

Interpreting the work of the media mujahidin as marketing or in terms of their ‘brand’, fails to comprehend the role of their work within the movement – just as focusing on infographics and thinking in 140 characters leads to misunderstanding of the breadth and purpose of da’wah. Similarly using Hollywood as a frame of reference, rather than deep-rooted research on Islamic theology; and narrowly defined ‘official’ images rather than the true breadth of Arabic sources may sound good for 15 seconds, but it frequently underestimates the scale of content production and lacks the depth required to understand the purpose or strategy of the movement.

Focusing on social media, images, infographics and videos as ways of branding the jihadist movement, confuses the purpose of Jihad and da’wah;

“Jihad is Da’wah with a force, and is obligatory to perform with all available capabilities, until there remains only Muslims or people who submit to Islam.”[i]

Future posts in the Data Science stream on Online Jihad will focus on two themes,

  1. Applying Data Science methodology to monitor and understand Jihadist online communities,
  2. Highlighting where many of the current approaches to analysis of the jihadist movement lack nuance, use inappropriate methodology and at times fail to produce an authentic understanding of movement nor its strategy.


[i] Hashiyat ash-Shouruni and Ibn al-Qasim in Tahfa al-Mahtaj ‘ala al-Minhaj 9/213

Quoted by Abdullah Azzam, Defence of the Muslim Lands, (English translation work done jihadist media)

The March 2016 Brussels Attacks – 10 Reasons by the “Islamic State” & the context of the Sunni extremist universe

October 15, 2017

umma wulud3 raqqa

On March 22, 2016, two bombings hit the city of Brussels. The bombings at Brussels airport and the metro station Maelbeek, which is located in the heart of the city and close by many European Union institutions, left 32 people dead from around the world – not including the three suicide bombers. As would later be the case with the Manchester bombings (May 22, 2017), several days later documents by IS were released to outline and justify these attacks. Based on theological grounds and grievances echoing from within the territory held by IS, a document was published on March 25, 2016, by al-Wafa’ – an official media organ of the “Islamic State”. The text is entitled “Ten Reasons to Clarify the Raids on the Capital [of Belgium] Brussels.” Penned by a woman by the nom de guerre of Umm Nusayba, ten reasons are clearly outlined why suicide bombers had attacked the airport and metro station.

This Arabic language text has not played any role, in the media reporting or the wider academia, to understand the motivation behind this terrorist attack – in the words of the terrorists. The same re-occurred when a similar text was released days after the May 2017 Manchester attack (here). It almost seems that ISIS has the luxury of disseminating their coherent extremist writings well knowing it reaches their target audience and bypasses most of the non-Arabic speaking counter-terrorism, media and academic analysts. Apart from being published on Telegram where a wider range of ISIS sympathizers is initiated into this mindset – and where most speak Arabic. The text references theological nuances and sentiments such as shirk as outlined earlier and maintains the obligation to attack the mushrikin and to “shake their thrones”.

“The Brussels raid that shocked the world and shook the thrones of the tawaghit[1] while the men of the caliphate – by the grace of God – have the capability to strike anywhere. Despite heightened security efforts.”[2]

The author then outlines the ten points which had been disseminated as well using the hash tag “Brussels raid” (ghazwa Bruksil) on Twitter while the document was released on Telegram. The ten points have to be read from a theological perspective from within the Sunni extremist ecosystem to understand the gravity and depth:

  1. The author describes Brussels as one of the main urban hubs where attacks against Muslims are organized. Addressing non-Muslims, the author asks, “isn’t Brussels the capital of the European Union which operates against Muslims? [This is] where hostile decision processes are undertaken against Muslims from within your [i.e. EU] territory.”
  1. Brussels was chosen furthermore as these decisions result in “you bombing Muslim civilians and innocent children, yet you claim to only target fighters of the Islamic State. Is an infant a grown male IS fighter and are the houses of civilians part of the barracks of the men of the Islamic State? Your mistakes in your war against the Islamic State have led you to dance in a cycle of death; for you are targeting unarmed civilians. Therefore, our response is proportionate to what you have done.” This reference is clear to those who are initiated into the Arabic-language dominated Sunni extremist mindset and ecosystem. It is a reference to Qur’an 16:126 as discussed only here in the framework of a just war against non-Muslim aggressors (as opposed to revenge operations within the sectarian war inside the Middle East). “You are the ones that started this wicked cycle of violence, God, exalted and might He is, says: “So if anyone commits transgression against you, attack him as he attacked you.”[3]

IS is part of the Sunni extremist tradition – and has to be considered within this context of an ocean of Arabic language Sunni extremist materials 

This divine equation of life – by jihadist standards – is not new or unique to ISIS. Yusuf al-‘Uyairi, former bin Laden bodyguard, first leader of al-Qa’ida in Saudi Arabia and prolific theologian published online in 2002 a 14-page long assessment of the hostage operation in Moscow by Chechen jihadists. In the wake of the hostage crisis at the musical “Ost-West” killing the hostages had been the last resort and not the main intention of this operation. Had this been at the center, the hostage-takers would have had lured the Russian Special Forces into the theater to kill as many as possible before starting to execute the hostages. “The Mujahideen do not desire to massacre civilians as the Russians do in Chechnya. For had this been the objective of previous operations then the Russian people would appreciate to a great extend the voices of the hardliners,[4] granting them to increase death and mayhem in Chechnya.”[5] Rather, as al-‘Uyairi outlined, the failure of “the Mujahideen to execute all hostages and likewise to blow up the building had not been their prime objective (…); killing the hostages was only a last resort for the Mujahideen.”[6] As

“the world is allied against the Chechen cause, America and Europe are in unison with Russia. When the Russians had been allowed [by their allies] to penetrate the territory of Georgia to fight the Mujahideen and the muhajireen, there had been no other option. All the states of the world remained silent regarding the massacres committed by the Russians in Chechnya. The Chechen people received no help at all from the world, neither mercy nor sympathy.”[7]

The right of self-defense, by all means, is the underlining justification. For how else could “the people of Chechnya defend themselves against the invaders[8] (or in the sense of the attack in Brussels: military aggressors that indiscriminately bomb targets in ISIS held territory) who came to their land, corrupting the religion and this world (al-din wa-l dunya).”[9] In the Russian context, al-‘Uyairi reasons any kidnapping and execution, any harm against the Russians as justified in the Qur’an and therefore as approved by shari’a law standards. He references Qur’an 2:194, but only the part suitable for his interpretation in the context of cloaking the ‘an-eye-for-an-eye’ equation in the divine language, as much as Umm Nusayba did in the 2016 document:

“So if anyone commits aggression against you, attack him as he attacked you, but be mindful of God.” (2:194)

Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, AQ leader in Iraq and the Godfather of IS used the very same part of the Qur’an to reason the kidnapping and execution of four staffers of the Russian embassy in Bagdad. The crimes committed in Chechnya and the Russian presence in Iraq had been the prime motivation to individually punish the members of the embassy for the Russian military engagement in the Caucasus – and ten years later to dispatch suicide bombers to attack critical infrastructure in Brussels and hit civilians.

Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, even though dead for over a decade, has left a substantial legacy. His speeches are from time to time featured in new IS videos and highlight the claim of fighting on behalf of the “prophetic methodology” that was conveyed by avantgardist fighters and leaders such as al-Zarqawi and others.

The reading of this particular verse is not only applied in the framework of kidnapping or executing individuals, but also to sanction greater attacks. As Abu Mus’ab al-Suri (Mustafa ‘Abd al-Qadir Sit Maryam Nasir), the alleged mastermind of the Madrid bombings (2004) wrote in an analysis to reason the London bombings in 2005,

“for our Qur’an and the sunna[10] of our prophet command us to refrain from killing women, children and pious men[11] devoted to religious worship, if they are clearly distinguished from men [of war] and have not fought [against Muslims]. However, the prophet commanded us to show hostility to those who committed aggression against us by committing the same aggression against them. Written in for you in the [holy] script is:

“so if anyone commits aggression against you, attack him as he attacked you.” This is a repetition of what had been prescribed for you in the Holy Script “an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.”[12] Our historical as well as contemporary scholars, however, decided that the enemies, when they have slain women, children, and non-combatants, it is our obligation to treat them likewise; compelling them to cease committing their crimes [and as deterrence]. This ruling is not just made by the scholars of the Mujahideen and the terrorists (irhabiyyin), but by all of the scholars, with the exception of the vermin and the apes of the munafiqin (hypocrites).”[13]

Al-Suri equates the tens of thousands killed in Iraq and Afghanistan to the deaths of 9/11:

“if we summon the death-toll of our two operations [9/11] to now [2005] as not more than 4,000 killed civilians since September 11th.”[14]

According to al-‘Uyairi, without any reference to works or scholars, the above mentioned parts of the Qur’an in it’s selective reading and interpretation are proof of sanctioning jihadist operations such as the Moscow theater siege, or as al-Suri related, to bomb the London public transportation. Or Brussels in 2016. For, in jihadist mindset,

“these verses are thoroughly discussed among the scholars [of Islam] and the like. In short, it is permissible for us to punish them as they punish us. For the Russians target innocent women and children, killing them intentionally and unabated. The Russian people are the ones supporting the military; they are the ones electing[15]them upon their nomination by the military hardliners. For if the people of Russia do not drink of the cup the Chechens have to drink of, for then they will not feel the bitterness. For if the Russians taste (dhaqa) the fire of war, then this will surely lead to the withdrawal of the peoples support for the operations of the army.”[16]

This is part of the basis of the partial reading of Qur’an 2:194 within the Sunni extremist ecosystem. All of the above-cited works are translated from Arabic. All writers had been native Arabic speakers and their works and actions continue to inspire the current as well as future generations of extremists. The readers of Umm Nusayba’s 2016 reaction to the March Brussels attack have most likely seen videos of al-Zarqawi killing hostages and at least parts of al-‘Uyairi’s work. This is part of the materials disseminated (either in full or partially) on Telegram, where Nusayba’s authoritative work, as published by ISIS official media al-Wafa’, has been released.

Ten Reasons to Attack Brussels (continued)

The third point is in particular relevant, as the growing polarization comes into play, roughly eight months after the refugee crisis hit Europe in the Summer of 2015.

  1. Brussels was attacked “as within your territory Muslims are threatened all the time and anywhere. Even up to the point of Christian extremist groups threatening Muslims in their mosques, turning them into targets and killing them. And your governments do nothing, turn a blind eye to these actions and do not refer to these acts as terrorism.” Umm Nusayba again references the above detailed parts of Qur’an 2:194 only in the active past tense: “therefore we have attack you as you have threatened and attacked (…).”
  2. “You have insulted our messenger – peace and blessings upon him – in your capital. You have sprayed graffiti insulting Muslims on their mosques and hung pictures of pigs as well on the mosques in your capital. [Belgian] Muslims organized demonstrations to have these attacks prohibited and those responsible punished. Your government has done nothing. And you believe we will forget the insults of our prophet? By God, never! And be it ten years later, we will and always will avenge our prophet and our mosques. Wherever our prophet has been insulted, we will strike in revenge. This is reason enough to conduct raids against you and wipe you out completely by nuclear weapons. You do not understand the depth of our love for our prophet. When the time is right, we will get even.”
  3. “For you imprison the virtuous, pure, chaste Muslimas or have you forgotten what you have done to our sister Malika [El-Aroud]?[17] You even took away her citizenship, all she did was marry a man who is a mujahid and tell the story about You took away her citizenship because she is a Muslima and you despise her Islam (…) while you make decisions to combat Muslims. (…) you may have forgotten her, we haven’t. Neither have we forgotten her sisters of the pure, virtuous Muslimas that are imprisoned by your hands. We have avenged them.”
  4. We attacked Brussels “for you imprison our men such as [the Paris master mind] Salah ‘Abd al-Salam, until when will he be held in prison? He did not attack your country and out of passion for France you arrested him. Don’t you understand that we are passionate for our imprisoned brothers (…)?”
  5. “The pressure on Muslims and the ban of the hijab as ruled by the Belgian courts. Likewise, the ban of the hijab in schools. You claim religious freedom and women’s rights, yet it does not apply to Muslims and their interests. You have forfeited your every principle and philosophy. (…) you assume Muslims are weak[18] and can be oppressed as you please, we, however, will not forget and therefore we have struck in revenge.”
  6. “You lie. Your media lies. You accuse Muslims of injustice and enmity. Even in the weakest phases [of the history] you repeat these accusations against them. You in your lies are misguiding people and frame Islam as a religion of savagery (…). Yet you switch the truth and take no responsibility for perpetrating crimes on Muslim soil and occupying it (…).”
  7. “We have been commanded to combat [non-Muslim] people until they confess “there is no God but God and Muhammad is the messenger of God.” (…) as reported by Ibn ‘Umar, the messenger of God – peace and blessings upon him – said: “I am ordered to combat the people until they confess there is no God but God and Muhammad is the messenger of God; and they profess the prayer and give zakat. For if they do this, then I will restrain myself of their blood and their possessions, except for what is rightfully to be claimed by Islam and by their account for God.”

This statement made by prophet Muhammad is cited from time to time in the Sunni extremist ecosystem to justify attacks and to emphasize their absolute claim of fighting for the absolute Islamization of the world. Umm Nusayba references the source of this hadith as conveyed by al-Bukhari 17/1, number 25 and Muslim 53/1, number 22. The same hadith has been used by one of the key theologians for the AQ driven resistance in Iraq at the time while being a core member of AQAP in Saudi Arabia. In an article by ‘Abdallah bin Muhammad al-Rushud for the first bi-weekly electronic al-Qa’ida magazine, Sawt al-jihad (“the Voice of Jihad”), he cites the hadith in an article on the viewpoint of “shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyya” to theologically outline the justification for violent acts in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere. In a second article, he states this hadith as the commandment to “combat people in general without discrimination as long as your objective is that they enter Islam.”[19] Umm Nusayba continues:

“I bring the joyful news to you that this religion will engulf the whole world (…). By God, we do not fight but to raise the speech of God and to spread justice among the people. There is no distinguishing between Arab and non-Arab, except for God-fearingness and piety, no white is more worth than black, except for piety.”

  1. “Our amir, our caliph, our leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi – may God protect him – has promised you revenge. He keeps his word and does not issue empty threats. Has he not promised revenge to anyone harming Muslims? Has he not told every taghut and their allies “for by God, we will avenge, by God, we will avenge and if it takes years.”[20] What is to come, will be more devastating and bitter.[21] His soldiers, operatives and followers are everywhere, waiting for the right time (…). We pledged loyalty and his orders are as [decisive] as a sword on our necks.”

The outlook that “Muslims are not being returned to the status they have been in the past” concludes the document. Because now there is an organized Sunni representation that is “a state and a caliph which is for Muslims, which won’t be destroyed as you would like to see it.” The greatest success ISIS reclaims is the conquest of territory and the consolidation under a formalistic rule of law, that is shari’a law by the most hardcore and extreme interpretation thereof – besides Saudi Arabia. By basing the legitimacy of rule on literally hundreds of thousands of historical writings of theological nature ISIS claims an Islamic statehood on highly coherent principles. Attacks in Brussels and elsewhere are framed as “state” foreign policy in the sense of western governments having formed an anti-ISIS coalition in combination with military action against the group in Syria and Iraq in particular. The “statehood” of ISIS is based theological literature – past and present. Authors in this repository, which is freely accessible online to anyone having the Arabic language skills needed and the openness to initiate into this engulfing, state of mind.[22]This ranges from Ibn Taymiyya to Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab as well as ‘intermediary theologians’ that had been key functionaries for the ‘classical’ al-Qa’ida – such as Yusuf bin Salih al-‘Uyairi or ‘Abdallah bin Muhammad al-Rushud. The application of this state of mind, embodied by the “Islamic State” and projected to the outside via social media in over two thousand official videos makes this Sunni extremist project one that has come true – and that is worth fighting for. In a simplified definition, ISIS represents the abode of Islam (dar al-Islam), promising “grievances for western states caused by lone lions who have assaulted them, penetrating deep in their flesh without mercy.”[23] For ISIS the war, despite territorial losses, is won. It has set the “correct creed as a seed in the minds of thousands of Muslims inside and outside of Syria and Iraq. Giving birth to a new generation on the grounds of the holy book and the sword.”[24]

[1] The “tyrants” as outlined in the previous chapters; the reference is commonly used for defined un-Islamic rulers in the Middle East and also references western governments who are engaged in a new crusade against Islam.

[2] Umm Nusayba, “’ashara asbab bayyina l-ghazwi Brussels al-‘asima”, al-Wafa’, March 25, 2016. Obtained on Telegram.

[3] Qur’an 2:194

[4] Lit.: “increase the  voices of men of war”.

[5] Yusuf al-‘Uyairi, ‘Amaliyya “masrah Moscow” madha rabiha ‘l-Mujahideen minha wa-madha khasiru?, 5-6.

[6] Yusuf al-‘Uyairi, ‘Amaliyya “masrah Moscow” madha rabiha ‘l-Mujahideen minha wa-madha khasiru?, 5.

[7] Yusuf al-‘Uyairi, ‘Amaliyya “masrah Moscow” madha rabiha ‘l-Mujahideen minha wa-madha khasiru?, 6.

[8] Lit.: “repelling the attacking aggressor”, daf’a al-‘adu al-sa’il. This is a reference to Ibn Taymiyya and also a slogan that was used in the Sawt al-Jihad magazine of the first generation al-Qa’ida branch in Saudi Arabia where al-‘Uyairi had been a core media member and its first leader.

[9] Yusuf al-‘Uyairi, ‘Amaliyya “masrah Moscow” madha rabiha ‘l-Mujahideen minha wa-madha khasiru?, 5.

[10] In the meaning of “tradition” but in the jihadist mindset as the role model for the proper conduct of “customary procedures.”

[11] Lit.: “men of religion” (rijal al-din).

[12] A reference to parts of Qur’an 5:45:

“In the Torah we prescribed for them a life for a life, an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, an equal wound for a wound.”

[13] Abu Mus’ab al-Suri. “Risala ila al-Britaniyyin wa-Europiyyin sha’ban wa-hukumat bi-sha’n tafjirat London”, July 2005, al-muqawamat al-Islamiyyat al-‘alimiyyat, 35.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Lit.: “giving their endorsement to them”.

[16] Yusuf al-‘Uyairi, ‘Amaliyya “masrah Moscow” madha rabiha ‘l-Mujahideen minha wa-madha khasiru?, 7.

[17] The story of Malika El-Aroud and her husband is available in the interview by Florian Flade: “Das Leben und Sterben des Moez Garsallaoui”, OJihad blog, October 17, 2012,

[18] mustada’ifin

[19] ‘Abdallah bin Muhammad al-Rushud, “al-muqassid al-thani min muqasid al-jihad: al-da’wa ila llah” Sawt al-Jihad number 18.

[20] Risala ila al-mujahidin wa-l umma al-Islamiyya fi shahr Ramadan li-amir al-mu’minin Abu Bakr al-Husayni al-Qurashi al-Baghdadi, Mu’assassat al-Furqan, Ramadan 3, 1435.

[21] This is a slogan that was utilized by ISIS in the wake of the attacks in Paris, November 2015. Videos released by wilayat Homs in November 2015 show French foreign fighters responding to the attack. The same media tactic was repeated shortly after the attacks occurred in March 2016 in Brussels (w. al-Raqqa, March 26).

[22] Worldview might come to mind from a a-religious western angle, yet it would neglect the appeal of physical-spiritual life in this world and the continuation of one’s existence in the ‘afterlife’ and paradise.

[23] Mu’awiyya al-Baghdadi, “madha jana al-tahaluf al-duwwali khilal akthar min ‘amayn min harbihi dudd al-dawlat al-Islamiyya, Mu’assassat Ashhad, May 2, 2017.

[24] Ibid.